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ABSTRACT—In a string of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has made it 
harder for consumers to avoid arbitration clauses, even when businesses 
strategically insert provisions in them that effectively prevent consumers 
from being able to bring any claim in any forum. 
Arbitration differs from litigation in ways that harm the interests of 
consumer antitrust plaintiffs. For example, arbitration limits discovery and 
has no meaningful appeals process. Furthermore, defendants use the terms 
in arbitration clauses to prevent class actions and to undercut the pro-plaintiff 
features of antitrust law, including mandatory treble damages, meaningful 
injunctive relief, recovery of attorneys’ fees, and a lengthy statute of 
limitations.  
The problems associated with antitrust arbitration are magnified in 
concentrated markets. Supporters of enforcing arbitration clauses assume 
that they these contractual provisions are the result of an informed, voluntary 
bargain. But when a market is dominated by a single supplier or a small 
group of firms, consumers often find it impossible to purchase a necessary 
product while retaining the right to sue, especially since arbitration clauses 
are generally embedded in contracts of adhesion. This means that in the 
markets most likely to be affected by antitrust violations, consumers are least 
likely to be able to avoid mandatory arbitration clauses. 
Antitrust authorities can address the problem of proliferating arbitration 
clauses. We argue that antitrust officials should condition merger approval 
on the merging parties’ agreement to not require arbitration of antitrust 
claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a string of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has made it harder for 
consumers to avoid arbitration clauses, even when businesses strategically 
insert provisions in them that effectively prevent consumers from being able 
to bring any claim in any forum. For example, when firms engage in illegal 
conduct that extracts small amounts of ill-gotten gains from millions of 
consumers, individual litigation (or arbitration) may cost more than the 
maximum possible recovery. In these scenarios, class action litigation or 
class-wide arbitration may be the only viable mechanisms for consumers to 
seek recovery. Yet, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,1 the Supreme 
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state laws that 
rendered class arbitration waivers in arbitration clauses unconscionable and, 
thus, unenforceable. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,2 
an antitrust case, the Court held that class action waivers embedded in 
mandatory arbitration clauses were enforceable even when they had the 
 
1 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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effect of making it economically irrational for the victims of antitrust 
violations to pursue their claims.3 
Part I of this Article examines how courts initially treated antitrust 
claims as nonarbitrable. For decades, courts considered antitrust claims to be 
too complex and too important to trust to private arbitrators. By the 1980s, 
the Supreme Court permitted federal statutory rights, including antitrust 
claims, to be arbitrated so long as the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate 
their rights in the alternative forum (the so-called Effective Vindication 
Doctrine). In 2013, the Supreme Court in Italian Colors fundamentally 
weakened the Effective Vindication Doctrine when it held that arbitration 
clauses that precluded class actions and class-wide arbitration were 
enforceable even when they effectively prevented any victim from actually 
bringing an individual case. 
Part II details the problems of mandatory arbitration of antitrust claims. 
Arbitration differs from litigation in ways that harm the interests of 
consumer–plaintiffs. For example, arbitration limits discovery and has no 
meaningful appeals process. Furthermore, defendants draft arbitration 
clauses to prevent class actions and to undercut the pro-plaintiff features of 
antitrust law, including mandatory treble damages, meaningful injunctive 
relief, recovery of attorneys’ fees, and a lengthy statute of limitations. With 
the Court’s undermining of the Effective Vindication Doctrine in Italian 
Colors, defendants’ efforts to dismantle these pro-plaintiff components of 
antitrust law may prove more successful in the future. 
Part III shows how the problems associated with antitrust arbitration are 
magnified in concentrated markets. Supporters of enforcing arbitration 
clauses assume that these contractual provisions are the result of an 
informed, voluntary bargain. But when a market is dominated by a single 
supplier or a small group of firms, consumers often find it impossible to 
purchase a necessary product while retaining the right to sue, especially since 
arbitration clauses are generally embedded in contracts of adhesion. This 
means that in the markets most likely to be affected by antitrust violations, 
consumers are least likely to be able to avoid mandatory arbitration clauses. 
Furthermore, when mergers result in concentrated markets, they can increase 
the problems explored in Part II. 
Finally, Part IV explains how antitrust authorities can address the 
problem of proliferating arbitration clauses. When evaluating mergers, 
officials at the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice can threaten to challenge the merger unless the 
merging parties agree to specified conditions, such as the divestiture of 
 
3 Id. at 2310–11. 
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certain assets. Because those mergers that pose the greatest risk of 
anticompetitive effects also magnify the problems associated with 
mandatory arbitration clauses, antitrust officials would be wise to condition 
merger approval on the merging parties’ agreement to not require arbitration 
of antitrust claims. This Part explains the rationale and precedent for the 
antitrust agencies to impose such conditions. 
I. ANTITRUST ARBITRATION AND THE EFFECTIVE  
VINDICATION DOCTRINE 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
Along with other common law traditions, the American legal system 
imported the English hostility to private arbitration as a substitute for public 
litigation.4 This resistance proved frustrating to supporters of commercial 
arbitration,5 who believed that private mediation was superior to traditional 
litigation because it was quicker, more efficient, and afforded the parties a 
degree of privacy unattainable in public litigation.6 Commercial arbitration 
was initially designed to settle trade disputes stemming from contracts.7 
Private arbitration afforded commercial actors the ability to structure their 
own rules and to select adjudicators who understood the relevant industry, 
including its trade customs.8 The informality of the process, coupled with the 
arbitrators’ expertise, could mean faster decisions delivered at a lower cost 
than full-blown litigation.9 
Despite the perceived advantages of commercial arbitration, federal 
judges were not eager to cede their power to private arbitrators.10 In response 
to this judicial reluctance, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act of 
 
4 Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazards for 
Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW 395, 401 n.39 (1993). 
5 Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
6 Thomas Campbell, Roxane Busey, & Peter Koch, Arbitrating Antitrust Claims—The Road Less 
Traveled, ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 8, 8. 
7 See Leslie, supra note 5. 
8 Thomas E. Dempsey, Case Comment, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 279, 280–81 (1968) (“Commenting 
on the advantages of arbitration, Judge Learned Hand said: ‘In trade disputes one of the chief advantages 
of arbitration is that arbitrators can be chosen who are familiar with the practices and customs of the 
calling, and with just such matters as what are current prices, what is merchantable quality, what are the 
terms of sale, and the like.’” (quoting Am. Almond Prods. Co. v. Consol. Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 
450 (2d Cir. 1944))).  
9 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[T]he informality of arbitral 
proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”); Lee 
Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (1969). 
10 See Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 401 (“U.S. courts initially were hostile to the notion of 
permitting arbitration of antitrust disputes.”). 
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1925 (FAA).11 Section 2 of the Act provides that if a commercial contract 
contains an agreement to settle controversies arising from the contract 
through private arbitration, the promise to arbitrate “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”12 The FAA repudiated “the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at 
English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and . . . 
place[d] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”13 
Section 2 created “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary.”14 The Act has proved influential.15 
Although Congress passed the FAA in 1925, federal courts did not 
meaningfully address the arbitrability of antitrust claims until the 1960s. In 
1968, the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. 
Maguire & Co.16 became the first court of appeals to hold that antitrust claims 
were not subject to arbitration.17 The Second Circuit articulated four reasons 
for concluding that the FAA did not apply to antitrust claims, which one 
scholar has summarized as: 
(1) deference to private arbitration agreements could lessen the plaintiffs’ 
incentive to pursue antitrust actions, weakening the use of “private attorneys 
general” as a foundation of Sherman Act enforcement; (2) arbitration clauses 
often result from adhesion contracts, and Congress intended that these matters 
be heard in the courts; (3) arbitrators may be incompetent to comprehend 
complex antitrust issues; and (4) arbitrators may be biased business people 
unable to reach fair outcomes.18 
 
11 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–18 (2012); In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 116 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to counteract ‘the traditional judicial hostility to the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 
(3d Cir. 2003))). 
12 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
13 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
14 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
15 John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced 
Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 227 (1986). 
16 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
17 Id. at 826–28; Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 402. 
18 Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. REV. 
395, 409 (2006) (summarizing American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826–27); see also Nghiem v. NEC Elec., 
Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In American Safety, the Second Circuit held that antitrust 
claims cannot be arbitrated because of the public interest in enforcing antitrust laws, the potential bias 
and limited expertise of arbitrators, the complexity of antitrust law, and the procedural differences 
between trials and arbitrations.”); Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the 
Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled 
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This rationale proved persuasive across the circuits, as courts relied on 
American Safety to hold that antitrust claims were not subject to arbitration.19 
By the mid-1980s, the American Safety rule prohibiting arbitration of 
antitrust claims was well-established and not particularly controversial.20 
B. The Birth of Antitrust Arbitration and the Effective  
Vindication Doctrine 
The American Safety doctrine began to erode in the 1980s as the 
Supreme Court interpreted the FAA as creating a heavy presumption in favor 
of arbitration for all claims.21 The Supreme Court began to dislodge this well-
entrenched rule when it considered whether Sherman Act claims could be 
decided by international arbitration tribunals in other countries. In Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,22 the Supreme Court held 
that an antitrust claim could be submitted to an international arbitral 
tribunal.23 Although the Mitsubishi Court claimed it was “unnecessary to 
assess the legitimacy of the American Safety doctrine as applied to 
agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions,”24 the majority 
specifically dissected and rejected the Second Circuit’s four rationales for 
making antitrust claims nonarbitrable.25 The Ninth Circuit treated the 
Mitsubishi “Court’s meticulous step-by-step disembowelment of the 
American Safety doctrine” as “effectively overrul[ing] American Safety and 
its progeny.”26 Other circuits followed suit and began to revisit their rules 
against allowing domestic antitrust claims to be arbitrated, ultimately 
holding that—despite the fact that Mitsubishi involved international 
 
Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 518 (2009) (reciting the four rationales in another 
fashion). 
19 See, e.g., Lake Commc’ns, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1984); Lee v. Ply*Gem 
Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Applied Dig. Tech., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 
116, 117–19 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. Int’l Indus., 
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971). 
20 See Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 403 (“Courts . . . continued to prohibit arbitration of antitrust 
claims for the next decade and a half [after American Safety].”). 
21 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (“[Q]uestions of 
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . The 
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the 
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”). 
22 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
23 Id. at 632–35. 
24 Id. at 629. 
25 Id. at 632–35 (expressing “skepticism of certain aspects of the American Safety doctrine”); see 
also Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 406 (“Although the Court’s holding in Mitsubishi is limited to the 
international arena, its logic is not.”). 
26 Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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arbitration—the opinion required that domestic antitrust lawsuits be subject 
to arbitration.27 
In the aftermath of Mitsubishi, as a new consensus emerged that 
antitrust claims were arbitrable, federal courts employed the Effective 
Vindication Doctrine to ensure that the statutory rights of antitrust plaintiffs 
were still protected. In holding that international arbitration could supplant 
judicial adjudication of antitrust claims, the Mitsubishi Court reasoned that 
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function.”28 If the antitrust plaintiff could not 
effectively vindicate its rights through arbitration, the arbitration agreement 
would be unenforceable and the plaintiff could pursue its antitrust claim in 
federal court. For example, the Mitsubishi majority “note[d] that in the event 
the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a 
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust 
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as 
against public policy.”29 Antitrust arbitration was permissible because 
antitrust plaintiffs could effectively vindicate their rights in an alternative 
noncourt forum. The Effective Vindication Doctrine provides that 
“arbitration of the claim will not be compelled if the prospective litigant 
cannot effectively vindicate his statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”30 The 
Eleventh Circuit has explained that “the arbitrability of [federal statutory] 
 
27 See, e.g., Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6, 11 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (expressly rejecting American Safety in view of Mitsubishi); Kotam Elecs., Inc. v. JBL 
Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724, 725–28 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); see also HCI Techs., Inc. v. Avaya, 
Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“A review of subsequent case law reveals that while the 
grim reaper may not yet have found American Safety’s address, he is certainly in the neighborhood.”); 
Hunt v. Up N. Plastics, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Minn. 1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision[] 
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. . . . call[s] into question the rationale of 
earlier cases exempting antitrust . . . claims from arbitration.” (citation omitted)); Acquaire v. Can. Dry 
Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Since the Mitsubishi decision was issued, a number 
of district courts in this circuit have held that domestic antitrust disputes are arbitrable. I find no reason 
to conclude otherwise . . . .” (citations omitted)); Syscomm Int’l Corp. v. Synoptics Commc’ns, Inc., 
856 F. Supp. 135, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“While American Safety has not been explicitly overruled, this 
Court believes that . . . domestic antitrust claims are arbitrable.”); Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he reasoning of Mitsubishi should apply with 
equal force to domestic claims.”), aff’d, 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1991); W. Int’l Media Corp. v. Johnson, 
754 F. Supp. 871, 873–74 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Although the Court supported its rejection of some of these 
concerns on grounds tied to the principles involved in international commercial transactions, the Court’s 
reliance on arbitration principles and the legislative histories of antitrust provisions suggests that the result 
arrived at in Mitsubishi would be forthcoming in the domestic situation.”). 
28 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
29 Id. at 637 n.19. 
30 In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 
2304, 2314 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“An arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the 
effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves that result.”). 
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claims rests on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief 
equivalent to court remedies. When an arbitration clause has provisions that 
defeat the remedial purpose of the statute, therefore, the arbitration clause is 
not enforceable.”31 Justice Kagan has explained the importance of the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine: 
The effective-vindication rule furthers the statute’s goals by ensuring that 
arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute resolution. With the rule, 
companies have good reason to adopt arbitral procedures that facilitate efficient 
and accurate handling of complaints. Without it, companies have every 
incentive to draft their agreements to extract backdoor waivers of statutory 
rights, making arbitration unavailable or pointless.32 
Courts have treated the Effective Vindication Doctrine as a safeguard for 
allowing claims to be arbitrated. For example, in Green Tree Financial 
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,33 the Supreme Court recognized that “the 
existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from 
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum” but 
found that the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence regarding such 
costs.34 If the evidence had been sufficient, the plaintiff could have evaded 
the arbitration clause and litigate in federal court.35 
Before the Supreme Court decided Italian Colors, antitrust courts 
applied the Effective Vindication Doctrine to screen out and refuse to 
enforce arbitration clauses that did not provide an opportunity to effectively 
assert antitrust claims. For example, federal courts in antitrust litigation had 
relied on the doctrine to invalidate class action waivers contained in 
arbitration agreements36 and a provision that prohibited an arbitrator from 
 
31 Paladino v. Avnet Comput. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) 
(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
32 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
33 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
34 Id. at 90; see also Ellen Meriwether, Class Action Waiver and the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
at the Antitrust/Arbitration Crossroads, ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 67, 67 (“In . . . Green Tree 
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that arbitration of 
federal statutory claims is appropriate where the plaintiffs’ statutory rights can be effectively vindicated 
through arbitration . . . .”). 
35 See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 634 (2012) (discussing Green Tree as placing the burden 
of proof on the party seeking to invalidate an antitrust arbitration agreement to show that “arbitration 
would be prohibitively expensive”); see also Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining 
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 825, 832 (2012) (“Lower courts have been uniform in their recognition of the Green Tree test.”). 
36 Meriwether, supra note 34, at 69 (“Courts of appeals have followed similar logic in applying the 
effective vindication doctrine, focusing on cost and other practical considerations that affect whether 
arbitration is an effective means to vindicate rights under federal law. In some antitrust cases, courts have 
relied on the doctrine to invalidate class action waivers.” (endnote omitted) (citing Kristian v. Comcast 
LEMLEY & LESLIE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 10:58 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
10 
awarding treble damages.37 But the future contours (and existence) of the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine are now in doubt, as we explain in the 
following Section. 
C. Italian Colors and the Death of the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,38 the Supreme 
Court revisited the Effective Vindication Doctrine after a group of merchants 
filed an antitrust class action against a credit card issuer.39 The merchants had 
entered contracts with American Express that contained arbitration clauses, 
which provided that “[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to 
be arbitrated on a class action basis.”40 Despite signing these class action 
waivers, the merchants filed an antitrust class action in federal court. The 
merchants argued that because the necessary expert witnesses were so 
expensive, compelling the merchants to individually arbitrate would prevent 
them from effectively vindicating their rights to an antitrust remedy; a class 
action represented the only cost-effective form of adjudication.41 
After the district court granted American Express’s motion to dismiss 
based on the arbitration clause, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that “the 
plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the class action waiver 
provision at issue should not be enforced because enforcement of the clause 
would effectively preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory 
rights asserted by the plaintiffs.”42 The Supreme Court vacated the Second 
Circuit’s decision without an opinion and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of its opinion in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp,43 which held that an arbitrator could not compel a party 
to submit to class-wide arbitration where the arbitration agreement was silent 
as to its availability.44 On remand, the Second Circuit declined a second time 
to enforce the class arbitration waiver.45 Shortly after that decision, the 
 
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 310, 320 (2d 
Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010))).  
37 James C. Justice Cos., Inc., v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *4 (S.D. W. 
Va. Mar. 27, 2008). 
38 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
39 Id. at 2307–08. 
40 Id. at 2308 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
41 Id. at 2308–09. 
42 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
43 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (mem.) (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)). 
44 559 U.S. at 684. 
45 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 667 F.3d 204 
(2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
LEMLEY & LESLIE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 10:58 AM 
110:1 (2015) Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval 
11 
Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,46 holding that 
the FAA preempted California’s rule against mandatory class arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts,47 and the Second Circuit revisited its 
judgment.48 On reconsideration, the Second Circuit again held that the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine precluded mandatory individual arbitration 
of the merchants’ claims.49 American Express appealed, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari for a second time.50 
The Supreme Court in Italian Colors again considered whether the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine excused the merchants from the mandatory 
arbitration clause and its class action waiver. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia began by diminishing the Effective Vindication Doctrine as “dictum 
in Mitsubishi Motors, where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on 
‘public policy’ grounds, arbitration agreements that ‘operat[e] . . . as a 
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.’”51 While 
seeming to question the doctrine’s pedigree,52 Justice Scalia converted it to a 
“willingness” of federal judges to protect plaintiffs instead of an obligation.53 
Justice Scalia then applied the doctrine to the facts of Italian Colors. He 
noted the merchants’ evidence “from an economist who estimated that the 
cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be 
‘at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ 
while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, 
or $38,549 when trebled.”54 Scalia asserted that what mattered was the right 
to pursue an antitrust remedy, not whether the merchants could exercise that 
right economically; he proclaimed that “the fact that it is not worth the 
 
46 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
47 Id. at 1753. Although Concepcion seemed to reject the Effective Vindication Doctrine in context 
of state claims, the case “was decided on preemption grounds, . . . and the Supreme Court had no occasion 
in that case to decide whether access to class proceedings was necessary for the effective vindication of 
a federal statutory right.” Meriwether, supra note 34, at 67. Cf. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2319–20 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“AT&T Mobility was not—and could not have been—about the effective-
vindication rule.”).  
48 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
49 Id. at 219–20.  
50 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
51 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)). But see id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So 
whatever else the majority might think of the effective-vindication rule, it is not dictum.”). 
52 Justice Scalia admitted that “[s]ubsequent cases have similarly asserted the existence of an 
‘effective vindication’ exception,” but then noted that the Court “declined to apply it to invalidate the 
arbitration agreement at issue.” Id. at 2310 (majority opinion) (citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 
556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 2308. 
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expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”55 As applied, this meant that 
“a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal 
statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”56 Consequently, the Court 
held that potential defendants can use arbitration clauses to prevent class 
actions57 even when a class action is the only way to effectively vindicate the 
right to an antitrust remedy because, according to Justice Scalia, “the 
antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the 
vindication of every claim.”58 
The majority opinion in Italian Colors effectively read the word 
“effective” out of the Effective Vindication Doctrine, turning it into what 
might be called the Nominal Vindication Doctrine. 59 The antitrust plaintiffs 
in that case were precluded from suing in federal court even though the 
evidence established that they could not effectively vindicate their statutory 
rights through arbitration. Although the majority opinion suggested that the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine “would certainly cover a provision in an 
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights” and 
“would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration 
that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable,”60 the Court 
never explained why an arbitration clause that rendered the individual 
plaintiffs’ costs of arbitrating “so high as to make access to the forum 
impracticable” was not similarly violative of the Effective Vindication 
Doctrine.61 
The Effective Vindication Doctrine has played an important role in 
preventing antitrust defendants from gutting the pro-plaintiff policies that 
have been the hallmarks of American antitrust law for over a century. But 
the holding and reasoning of Italian Colors suggest that that protection is 
over. 
 
55 Id. at 2311. 
56 Id. at 2307. 
57 Id. at 2311 (discussing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32). 
58 Id. at 2309. 
59 See Mark Bolin, Fear and Loathing of Class Action Arbitration, or How to Dismiss the Effective 
Vindication Doctrine, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563 (2014) (making this argument). 
60 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. 
61 See id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority is quite sure that the effective-vindication 
rule does not apply here, but has precious little to say about why.”). 
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II. ANTITRUST ARBITRATION IN THE ABSENCE OF  
EFFECTIVE VINDICATION 
This Part considers the original concerns of the American Safety court, 
together with additional problems that may arise in antitrust arbitration in the 
wake of Italian Colors. Arbitration always entails procedural differences 
from traditional litigation, and these differences may as a practical matter 
implicate substantive rights. In theory, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory 
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it 
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”62 
Nevertheless, scholars have long argued that “the antitrust plaintiff is 
deprived of important statutory rights in arbitration proceedings, such as the 
rights to treble damages, attorney fees, and liberal forum selection.”63 
In the immediate post-Mitsubishi era, federal courts relied on the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine to thwart defendants’ attempts to constrain 
antitrust law via arbitration clauses.64 With Italian Colors’ weakening of the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine, potential antitrust defendants are more likely 
to use arbitration clauses to substantially reduce both the probability of 
antitrust liability and the amount of damages recovered by successful 
antitrust plaintiffs. Potential defendants are likely to strategically deploy 
arbitration clauses because, relative to traditional antitrust litigation, antitrust 
arbitration confers substantial advantages on defendants and imposes 
tremendous costs on plaintiffs. This Part examines the differences between 
arbitration and litigation, and shows that antitrust defendants have attempted 
to exploit these differences to prevent antitrust plaintiffs from effectively 
vindicating their rights. 
A. Procedural Differences 
Arbitration changes the procedures for adjudicating antitrust claims. 
Civil litigation in federal district courts is governed by extensive rules, 
including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and local court rules, as well as the judicial precedent interpreting 
all of these rules.65 Arbitration eliminates this intricate set of procedural 
 
62 In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
63 Allison, supra note 15, at 238. 
64 See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos., v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *4 (S.D. 
W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008). 
65 Gregory G. Wrobel, We’re Not in Kansas Anymore: Arbitrating Antitrust Claims, ANTITRUST, 
Fall 2004, at 5, 6. 
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protections.66 Although many commentators have praised “the relative 
informality and flexibility of the arbitral process” as more efficient than 
traditional antitrust litigation,67 this Section explains how this truncation of 
process—while facially more economical—can undermine the purposes of 
antitrust law and policy.  
1. Discovery Limitations.—Arbitration  limits  discovery compared  to 
traditional litigation. For example, arbitration does not generally use the full 
panoply of depositions, interrogatories, document requests, and motions to 
compel that are common in federal court.68 In particular, third-party 
discovery may be difficult or impossible depending on the circumstances.69 
Although arbitrators can summon witnesses for the actual arbitration,70 pre-
arbitration discovery from nonparty witnesses may not be possible,71 thus 
reducing the efficiency of the arbitration itself and making it harder for the 
parties to assess the strength of a case before trial. Such problems are 
particularly acute when dealing with international arbitration or foreign-
 
66 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 657 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 648 n.14 (“[T]he 
factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the 
arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and 
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and 
testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.” (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974))). 
67 Loevinger, supra note 9, at 1089. 
68 Charles E. Buffon & Joshua D. Wolson, Antitrust Arbitration Counseling, ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, 
at 31, 32 (“For example, some arbitration rules do not permit depositions, but, instead, require witnesses 
to be called to a hearing before the arbitrator. Similarly, arbitration rules can be selected that do not allow 
document discovery that is as broad as that permitted under federal and state procedural rules . . . .”); 
Campbell et al., supra note 6, at 8 (“The procedural formalities of litigation—depositions, interrogatories, 
document requests, objections to discovery, motions to compel, motions to dismiss, third-party discovery, 
motions for summary judgment—are generally disfavored.”); see also Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, 
Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 464 n.66 
(2014) (“For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Healthcare Payor Provider 
Arbitration Rules, which govern billing-related disputes, limit discovery to one deposition per party 
unless ordered by the arbitrator.” (citation omitted)). 
69 Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 410 (“Finally, the most significant and often discussed objection 
to arbitrating antitrust disputes concerns the difficulties in acquiring evidence from unwilling third parties. 
This barrier may prove virtually insuperable in many ‘conspiracies with strangers’ type antitrust 
disputes.”); Elizabeth B. McCallum & R. Mark McCareins, Arbitration Procedures: The Rules of the 
Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 15, 18. 
70 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
71 McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 18 (“The circuits are split on whether the arbitrators 
have authority under the FAA to order third-party production of evidence before the arbitration 
hearing . . . .”); see, e.g., Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71–73 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (discussing and ultimately denying the power of arbitration contracts to compel nonparties to 
appear at prehearing depositions). 
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based evidence,72 as foreign arbitrators sometimes do not have authority to 
secure witnesses or documents.73 
Supporters of binding arbitration view this constriction of discovery as 
an advantage. Some commentators see these restrictions as an antidote for 
discovery run amok in antitrust litigation.74 Others have suggested that 
“[l]imited discovery often forces practitioners to narrow and sharpen their 
case earlier in the process than they might otherwise have done.”75 The 
Supreme Court has suggested that the diminished discovery is a reasonable 
cost for the “simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”76 This 
tradeoff may be of particular value to foreign defendants that are “troubled 
by the breadth and intrusiveness of American discovery.”77 
While limited discovery reduces costs, it also makes it harder for 
plaintiffs to get necessary information from antitrust defendants. Discovery 
is often critical in antitrust litigation in a way that it is not in garden-variety 
commercial litigation, which generally turns on contract language and trade 
customs. In contrast, “the heart of any American antitrust case is the 
discovery of business documents. Without them, there is virtually no case.”78 
In antitrust litigation, plaintiffs generally require more discovery than do 
defendants because “much of the information needed to prove that a 
monopolist is monopolizing is under the control of the monopolist.”79 
 
72 Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 411 (“The problem of third-party discovery in arbitration is 
generally more complex in the international context.”). 
73 E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 657 n.31 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Japanese arbitrators do not have the power of compulsory process to secure 
witnesses and documents, nor do witnesses who are available testify under oath.”). 
74 Allison, supra note 15, at 247. Allison has since pointed out that his argument applies to negotiated 
arbitration agreements and should not have been extended to contracts of adhesion. E-mail from John R. 
Allison, Mary John & Ralph Spence Centennial Professor of Bus. Admin., McCombs Graduate Sch. of 
Bus., Univ. of Texas at Austin, to Mark Lemley, author (Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with authors). 
75 McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 18. 
76 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S., at 
628). Lower courts are generally not sympathetic to arguments against arbitration based on limited 
discovery. See, e.g., In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
77 Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 31. 
78 In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (quoting Timothy G. 
Smith, Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments 
in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 747, 747 
(1974)); see also Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 425 (“Adequate discovery often is key to the resolution 
of antitrust disputes.”). 
79 Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal 
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 140 (2006) (“In arbitration, 
discovery is limited, making it much less likely that a victim of the monopoly will be able to establish his 
case and protect the rights Congress intended him to have.”); see also Andrea Doneff, Is Green Tree v. 
Randolph Still Good Law? How the Supreme Court’s Emphasis on Contract Language in Arbitration 
Clauses Will Impact the Use of Public Policy to Allow Parties to Vindicate Their Rights, 39 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 63, 65 (2012) (“In addition, arbitration’s efficiencies often impact the party that can least afford 
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Consequently, discovery restrictions asymmetrically benefit antitrust 
violators over their victims. 
Antitrust defendants can withhold damning documents during 
arbitration and the antitrust plaintiff may have no meaningful recourse. For 
example, federal rules criminalizing perjury and spoliation of evidence do 
not generally apply to arbitration,80 which reduces deterrence of such abuses. 
Federal courts have reasoned that “[a]ny dispute over discovery would be 
procedural in nature, and therefore left for an arbitrator to resolve.”81 Federal 
judges, for example, are generally deferential to arbiter decisions to reject 
plaintiffs’ evidence requests.82 The Supreme Court has also proved itself 
unsympathetic to discovery-based arguments against arbitration.83 
Consequently, lower federal courts have held that limited discovery does not 
“raise[] a question of arbitrability.”84 
Arbitration could facilitate full discovery procedures if the parties agree 
to do so.85 Potential antitrust violators, however, are likely to structure 
arbitration clauses to limit discovery in any subsequent arbitration. And 
Concepcion and Italian Colors give them the ability to do so.86 Antitrust 
litigation often involves document asymmetry in that the defendant is rarely 
 
the impact. Discovery may be significantly less broad in arbitration than in litigation. The party suing 
often has less information than the party being sued, so discovery can be key to a successful lawsuit.”). 
80 Kristen M. Blankley, Taming the Wild West of Arbitration Ethics, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 925, 928–
29 (2012). 
81 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2006).  
82 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 
301 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Every failure of an arbitrator to receive relevant evidence does not constitute 
misconduct requiring vacatur of an arbitrator’s award.” (quoting Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & 
Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1985))); Kellogg Brown 
& Root Servs., Inc. v. Altanmia Commercial Mktg. Co., Civ. A. No. H-07-2684, 2007 WL 4190795, at 
*12 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2007) (“Arbitrators do have broad discretion to make decisions about what 
evidence they will accept and consider. Int’l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbia Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 
491, 497 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not the role of the courts to dictate what evidence an arbitrator may consider 
in reaching his decision.”); McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 17. 
83 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). 
84 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 42–43.  
85 Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 425 (“Parties can incorporate some or all discovery as permitted 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although a higher showing of need may be required to govern 
pre-arbitration discovery.”); McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 18 (“For instance, some 
agreements provide that the discovery procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 
apply.”); see also Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes: Freedom to Contract for an 
Alternative Forum, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 117–18 (1997) (describing various discovery procedure 
options parties can include in arbitration clauses, including “a requirement that ‘good cause’ must be 
shown in order to obtain leave to take a deposition, subjecting all discovery activities to a pre-agreed time 
limit, and, in three-arbitrator cases, agreeing that discovery disputes can be resolved by one arbitrator, 
typically the chair, rather than the entire panel”). 
86 See, e.g., Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing 
Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 462–63 (2013). 
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going to need critical documents from the plaintiff while the plaintiff’s case 
may turn on the smoking gun in the defendants’ files. In contrast to 
arbitration, litigation does not give defendants the input—input that 
sometimes amounts to veto power—over the discovery process that 
arbitration does. 
2. Arbitrator   Qualifications   and   Bias.—The  processes  by  which 
arbitral tribunals are constituted may result in arbitrators who are either 
unqualified to decide antitrust disputes, biased, or both. These risks are 
independent but can operate in tandem. In this Section we discuss each 
separately. 
Arbitrator competence is not a new concern; the Second Circuit in 
American Safety worried that commercial arbitrators may not have sufficient 
experience or qualifications to decide antitrust issues.87 Traditionally, 
arbitrators were often industry experts, not lawyers or judges.88 When an 
antitrust claim is part of a broader lawsuit, courts have expressed concern 
that arbitrators may be selected for the knowledge of other relevant areas of 
law or trade custom, and consequently “ill-equipped to interpret the antitrust 
laws.”89 
In theory, knowledgeable arbitrators, including one or more with 
antitrust experience, may be available to decide complex antitrust cases.90 
Ideally, the parties can select an arbitrator with both a sophisticated legal 
background and an understanding of the relevant industry.91 The defendant 
that recognizes its conduct has crossed the line, however, has every incentive 
to keep arbitrators who understand antitrust law off of the panel. For 
example, in one infamous older case, the antitrust defendant rejected as 
arbitrators every lawyer with antitrust knowledge and approved only 
businesspeople and money lenders, despite the novelty and complexity of 
 
87 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[I]t is the business community generally that is regulated by 
the antitrust laws. Since commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for their business expertise, it 
hardly seems proper for them to determine these issues of great public interest. . . . We express no general 
distrust of arbitrators or arbitration . . . .”).  
88 Loevinger, supra note 9, at 1090 (“Arbitrators are likely to be businessmen who are knowledgeable 
in the trade but not qualified to pass judgment on antitrust claims.”); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 654 n.23 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Federal antitrust 
issues . . . are considered to be at once too difficult to be decided competently by arbitrators—who are 
not judges, and often not even lawyers—and too important to be decided otherwise than by competent 
tribunals.” (citation omitted)). 
89 Associated Milk Dealers, Inc., v. Milk Drivers Union, Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 
1970) (“Arbitrators are ill-equipped to interpret the antitrust laws and their consideration of possible 
violations would add little.”). 
90 McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 17. See, e.g., Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 418 
(noting a case where the arbitrator was Thomas E. Kauper, an antitrust professor at the University of 
Michigan School of Law and former Assistant Attorney General). 
91 Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 32. 
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the antitrust issues involved.92 In the American Safety era, Judge Posner once 
explained that antitrust issues were not arbitrable because “[t]hey are 
considered to be at once too difficult to be decided competently by 
arbitrators—who are not judges, and often not even lawyers—and too 
important to be decided otherwise than by competent tribunals.”93 
Even if an arbitrator is sufficiently experienced to understand an 
antitrust claim, the prospect of bias can undermine faith in the process. 
Structural features common to antitrust arbitration also raise a substantial 
possibility that an arbitrator will be biased. Traditional accounts of 
arbitration’s advantages do not account for this possibility because they 
envision commercial arbitration as between two businesses, often 
participants in the same industry. In those circumstances, there is less risk of 
the arbitrator having an industry bias that systematically favors plaintiffs 
over defendants or vice versa because both parties and the arbitrator are 
members of the same business community. Antitrust disputes, by contrast, 
often involve consumers suing dominant firms. Selecting arbitrators from the 
business community in such scenarios creates the possibility of weakened 
antitrust scrutiny against defendants.94 The reality of arbitrator bias came in 
to stark relief in 2009 when the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office sued 
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)—the then-leading debt collection 
arbitration forum—for fraud because of its hidden financial ties to the debt 
collection industry.95 Within days after the suit was filed, the NAF settled by 
agreeing to stop arbitrating consumer debt collection claims.96 
Even absent outright deception, such as that engaged in by the NAF, 
repeat-player bias may infect the arbitration process.97 Defendants—but not 
 
92 John J. Finn, Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. INDUS. 
& COM. L. REV. 406, 412–13 (1969) (discussing Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 
237 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1968)). 
93 Univ. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1983). 
94 See Finn, supra note 92, at 414 (“[B]ecause of the natural wariness of industry in general toward 
antitrust restrictions, the tendency would in all probability run in the direction of weakening antitrust 
standards.”); Loevinger, supra note 9, at 1090 (“Antitrust law is a code for restraining business conduct. 
Consequently those who are likely to be chosen as arbitrators are not likely to be sympathetic to antitrust 
rules. In any event, the tenure of arbitrators does not give them the independence of judges; they are more 
apt to seek results which are acceptable to the parties than to insist upon decisions which may be socially 
desirable but unfavorable to the parties.”). 
95 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM 39 (2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-
protection-staff-report-repairing-broken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf [perma.cc/WEK3-
9LRD]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice 
System,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1 (noting that arbitrators have a pro-business bias).  
96 Id. at 39–40. See also Consent Judgment, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 27-CV-09-
18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YV63-6UHX].  
97 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 95, at 48. 
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plaintiffs—are likely to be repeat players in consumer antitrust arbitrations.98 
Some scholars have speculated “that arbitrators often answer for their 
ongoing business to the party being sued—the large corporation that places 
an arbitration clause in all its contracts becomes a repeat customer that ends 
up keeping the arbitrator in business—and therefore become biased in favor 
of the corporation.”99 Courts have noted that arbitration favors corporate 
defendants because “[s]everal studies have found and several courts have 
held that a party’s repeated appearance ‘before the same group of arbitrators 
conveys distinct advantages over the [one-time participant].’”100 This has 
been shown to be a problem in other areas of law where one side is a repeat 
player, including employment law,101 securities arbitrations,102 and the 
ICANN trademark dispute resolution process.103 If the market for arbitrators 
favors those arbitrators most likely to rule for an antitrust defendant—and 
the structure of the market for arbitrators suggests that it does104—then 
arbitrators may have either an overt or unconscious bias to view evidence in 
a positive light toward the defense in antitrust cases.105 Furthermore, some 
 
98 In practice, the fact that a relatively small group of plaintiff’s antitrust lawyers are repeat players, 
even if their clients are not, may mitigate this risk somewhat. 
99 Doneff, supra note 79, at 65 (citing Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World 
of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010)); see also Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and 
the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 4 J. INT’L 
DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (identifying sources of systemic bias in arbitration); Andrew T. Guzman, 
Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1303 (2000) 
(arguing that reputational concerns will cause arbitrators to honor arbitration agreements over mandatory 
rules). 
100 Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 579 (Ky. 2012) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)); see also 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 95, at 48–49 (reviewing a study that found that “arbitrators who decided 
in favor of firms, as opposed to consumers, subsequently received more matters from the arbitration 
forum”). 
101 See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes 
and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (finding “a significant repeat-employer–
arbitrator pairing effect in which employees on average have lower win rates and receive smaller damage 
awards where the same arbitrator is involved in more than one case with the same employer”). 
102 See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing 
with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1110–11 (1999) 
(advocating securities arbitrations take place “under the auspices of the SEC” to mitigate against any 
potential pro-industry bias). 
103 See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornberg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN 
Dispute Resolution Process, 6 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 89, 121 (2002) (“[A] subtler kind of direct 
bias may arise from the volume of business that a repeat player can bestow.”). 
104 Kelsey J. Dolven, Comment, David Versus Two Goliaths: Why the Wisconsin State Legislature 
Needs to Update the Wisconsin Consumer Act by Placing Restrictions on Mandatory Arbitration, 
2014 WIS. L. REV. 139, 142 (“Arbitrators compete to be selected by the parties, work under short-term 
contracts, and may fear a loss of future work if their decisions are seen as unfavorable to the parties that 
are most likely to appear in subsequent arbitrations.”). 
105 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 
308–18 (2010) (discussing cognitive bias). 
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arbitrators may not apply U.S. antitrust law as defined by binding federal 
precedent, potentially weakening another constraint on biased 
decisionmaking.106 
In sum, problems of competence and bias ensue when arbitrators are 
chosen for their business knowledge, not their familiarity with the 
complexities of antitrust law.107 Indeed, antitrust law is more complicated 
now than when the Second Circuit rendered antitrust claims nonarbitrable in 
American Safety.108 
To be sure, no system of adjudication is perfect. Judges and juries will 
not necessarily be familiar with antitrust law either. And individual judges 
or juries may be biased in particular cases. But judges and juries are at least 
required to apply the law, and any biases are likely to be idiosyncratic, not 
systematic. 
This risk of consumers being forced to have their antitrust claims 
decided by an arbitrator who is either unqualified or biased is ever present. 
This danger is amplified by the fact that a losing consumer’s ability to appeal 
an adverse arbitration ruling is severely limited, as the following Section 
explains. 
3. Limited Appeals.—The powers of arbitrators—and the costs of their 
mistakes—are magnified by the lack of meaningful review. Although federal 
judicial review of arbitration decisions and awards is theoretically possible, 
the bases for vacating an arbitral award under the FAA are essentially limited 
to awards secured through corruption, fraud, and undue means.109 An 
 
106 Guzman, supra note 99, at 1306 (“In one survey, albeit somewhat dated, 90% of the arbitrators 
surveyed felt that ‘they were free to ignore these rules [of substantive law] whenever they thought that 
more just decisions would be reached by doing so.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Soia Mentschikoff, 
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961))); id. at 1297 (criticizing Mitsubishi 
because “there is no guarantee that the arbitrators will, in fact, apply U.S. antitrust laws to the dispute”); 
id. at 1306 (“Even judges have recognized that arbitrators are willing to ignore substantive legal rules.” 
(citing Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.), rev’d, 346 U.S. 427 (1953))).  
107 Loevinger, supra note 9, at 1088 (“Arbitrators are often businessmen chosen for their familiarity 
with the practices of a particular industry or their expertise with the issues in dispute. Most arbitrators 
would be unfamiliar with antitrust problems.”); id. at 1090 (“Antitrust issues are usually complicated, 
extensive and diverse and involve specialized legal claims and rules. The length and complexity of 
antitrust trials is a matter of common knowledge among lawyers, and the specialized and technical nature 
of antitrust principles is a matter of common and unfavorable comment among businessmen.”); Robert 
Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1077–78 (1969) (“Another 
problem arises if the arbitrator, consistent with current practices, is a businessman chosen for his 
familiarity with the details of the industry in which the controversy arises. Most antitrust issues are too 
technical and complex to be disposed of by untrained personnel.”). 
108 Fewer claims are subject to per se treatment now than in the 1960s. See Maurice E. Stucke, 
Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 529 (“Since the 1980s, antitrust’s per se liability 
standard is being applied to fewer practices.”).  
109 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). See Campbell et al., supra note 6, at 12. 
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arbitrator’s getting the law wrong is not grounds for appeal.110 Review by 
federal judges is not merely deferential; it is often nonexistent.111 There is no 
effective mechanism to correct most types of mistakes, even when those 
mistakes are dispositive.112 Because arbitrators are generally not required to 
issue written opinions or to explain their reasoning, they often do not.113 The 
absence of an adequate record means that in many cases “the arbitrator’s 
decision is virtually unreviewable.”114 Even when a record exists, federal 
courts do not generally review an arbitrator’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.115 The lack of a full appeals process is also troubling 
because an arbitrator can grant the equivalent of summary judgment, which 
means that an antitrust plaintiff can lose without a full hearing and without 
any recourse.116 
As a result, arbitrators can get the law wrong and the losing party can 
still be without recourse.117 Because courts are bound to enforce arbitration 
decisions “absent extremely limited circumstances,” even incorrect 
decisions will very likely be “final and effectively unappealable.”118 Writing 
in the context of foreign arbitration panels, the Supreme Court has noted that 
“[a]n arbitral award can be made without explication of reasons and without 
development of a record, so that the arbitrator’s conception of our statutory 
 
110 Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 33. 
111 McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 21 (“[T]he arbitrator’s ‘“improvident, even silly, fact-
finding” does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.’” (endnote 
omitted)). But see Eric James Fuglsang, Comment, The Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust Disputes: 
Where Does the Law Stand?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 779, 809 n.264 (1997) (collecting cases where federal 
courts overturned arbitrator decisions). 
112 Finn, supra note 92, at 413 (“[I]t is important to note that the opportunity for correction of errors 
is very limited. In a court proceeding errors of law are open to close scrutiny and correction on appeal. 
On the other hand, the decisions of arbitrators are essentially final and binding.” (citing Wilko v. Swan, 
346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953); James Richardson & Sons v. W.E. Hedger Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55, 57 
(2d Cir. 1938))). This includes incorrect findings of antitrust liability. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 657 n.32 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The greatest risk, 
of course, is that the arbitrator will condemn business practices under the antitrust laws that are efficient 
in a free competitive market. In the absence of a reviewable record, a reviewing district court would not 
be able to undo the damage wrought.” (citation omitted)). 
113 Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 294 (2013); see also id. at 297 n.108 (citing cases confirming that arbitrators are 
under no obligation to write opinions). Some arbitration organizations allow consumers to request a 
written decision that reflects the arbitrator’s reasoning and award. See id. at 299–300. This is in flux, as 
some dispute resolution organizations have moved toward encouraging an opinion of some sort. Id. at 
302. 
114 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 656–57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115 McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 21. 
116 See id. at 19. 
117 Loevinger, supra note 9, at 1087 (“Arbitrators are not bound by rules of law; their decisions are 
essentially final and cannot be set aside for misapplication of the law.”). 
118 Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 33. 
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requirement may be absolutely incorrect yet functionally unreviewable, even 
when the arbitrator seeks to apply our law.”119 Thus, while an arbitrator’s 
“manifest disregard” of the law may theoretically provide a basis for 
reversal,120 this will be difficult to prove in the absence of a full record or an 
opinion, especially when federal courts are so deferential to private 
arbitrators.121 
B. Arbitration and Antitrust Remedies 
Many arbitration clauses attempt to do much more than merely provide 
an alternative decisionmaker to take the place of a federal judge. Although 
arbitration is not supposed to affect substantive antitrust law,122 many clauses 
explicitly limit remedies, forbid fee shifting, and truncate statutes of 
limitations. This creates a problem given that the Supreme Court has held 
that the FAA “requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according 
to their terms.”123 This Section illustrates defendants’ efforts to evade the pro-
plaintiff aspects of statutory antitrust law. 
1. Treble  Damages.—The  successful   private   antitrust  plaintiff   is 
entitled to treble damages.124 The trebling is mandatory; the judge exercises 
no discretion.125 This provision for mandatory treble damages was unique 
when adopted,126 highlighting the importance that Congress attached to 
private antitrust actions. 
The automatic trebling of antitrust damages serves three related 
purposes. First, increasing damages enhances deterrence. The Supreme 
Court has noted that “[t]he treble-damages provision wielded by the private 
litigant is a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial 
 
119 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974). 
120 Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumers from Significantly One-
Sided Arbitration Clauses Within Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 691 (2013). 
121 This lack of a meaningful appeals process is particularly frustrating because the legislative history 
of the Federal Arbitration Act suggests that the 1925 Congress believed that the party that lost at 
arbitration would have a meaningful right to appeal in court. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial 
Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
68th Cong. 36–37 (1924). 
122 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
123 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). 
124 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
125 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47 (1st Cir. 2006) (“15 U.S.C. § 15(a) states in relevant 
part that a private antitrust plaintiff ‘shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained.’ (emphasis 
added) Congress’s use of the word ‘shall’ makes the treble damages remedy a mandatory result if a 
plaintiff successfully sues an antitrust violator.”). Statutory exemptions to mandatory trebling exist, but 
are not relevant to our analysis. 
126 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 653 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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deterrent to potential violators.”127 While triple actual damages may seem 
like a penalty to the defendant and a windfall to plaintiffs, the fact that 
antitrust violations are clandestine,128 and thus hard to detect, means that 
awarding only actual damages would allow many defendants to get away 
with violating the law and encourage others to make a rational choice to 
violate the law and risk nothing worse than giving up their gains from illegal 
behavior.129 
In addition to deterrence, a second major purpose of the treble damage 
remedy is “to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.”130 
The Court has often described trebling as serving an essential remedial 
purpose.131 And because antitrust violations can take many years to discover 
and many more—even decades—to litigate,132 an increase in damages is 
necessary to compensate for the interest lost during the period of 
overcharge.133 
 
127 Id. at 635 (majority opinion) (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 
138–39 (1968)); see also Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History—What Have We Learned About Private 
Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 379, 382 
(2004) (“The core, modern rationale for treble damages must be deterrence.”). To be sure, optimal 
deterrence is not perfect deterrence. See Michael K. Block & J. Gregory Sidak, The Costs of Deterrence: 
Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1131 (1980) (arguing for optimal deterrence 
and noting that such a policy will not deter all antitrust violations). The antitrust laws settled on treble 
damages as a compromise between under- and overdeterrence of antitrust violations. See Howard A. 
Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683, 711 (2011). 
128 Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1621, 1634 (2008). 
129 Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action 
Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1039 (2008) (“As long as a firm enjoys a non-negligible chance of 
evading responsibility, violating antitrust laws appears rational: if not caught, the firm secures illegal 
profits, and, if caught, it simply returns the ill-gotten gains.”); see also Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. 
Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1269 (2013) (arguing that private antitrust actions serve a substantial compensatory and 
deterrent purpose); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 115 (1993) (arguing that various factors render treble damages less than a true tripling of actual 
damages); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less 
than Single Damages, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1997 (2015). 
130 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). 
131 E.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 635–36 (“Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function, 
the treble-damages cause of action conferred on private parties by § 4 of the Clayton Act . . . seeks 
primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that injury.” (citation omitted)). 
132 See, e.g., JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 349 (2d ed. 2008) (describing a Department 
of Justice investigation and prosecution lasting over six years); Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 381 (1970) (finding the average duration of antitrust cases 
to be over twenty months). 
133 Unlike other areas, such as patent law, antitrust does not provide for awards of prejudgment 
interest. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 582–83 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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The third purpose of treble damages is to “encourage private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.”134 Government enforcement might punish 
past violations and prohibit illegal conduct in the future, but it cannot 
compensate customers for overcharges or the loss of competition. And 
government enforcers may not have the motivation or the resources to 
enforce the antitrust laws optimally, particularly if the defendants are 
politically powerful.135 By ensuring a substantial payoff for successful 
antitrust claims, mandatory treble damages create “a special incentive” for 
private actors to challenge antitrust violators.136 As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, Congress provided “the antitrust treble-damages provision [to] 
give[] private parties an incentive to bring civil suits that serve to advance 
the national interest in a competitive economy.”137 
Treble damages, in short, serve triple duty. 
Despite—or perhaps because of—the multiple purposes served by 
antitrust law’s trebling provision, potential antitrust defendants have sought 
to detreble antitrust damages through arbitration. In drafting mandatory 
arbitration clauses, potential antitrust defendants often try to nullify the 
Sherman Act’s treble damage provision.138 For example, an arbitration clause 
imposed by Comcast provided: 
IN NO EVENT SHALL WE OR OUR EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS HAVE 
ANY LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE, TREBLE, EXEMPLARY, SPECIAL, 
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. . . . SUCH 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY APPLIES IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUCH DAMAGES MAY BE AVAILABLE 
UNDER APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE PARTIES HEREBY WAIVE 
THEIR RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO RECOVER ANY SUCH DAMAGES.139 
This represents an explicit effort to circumvent statutory law. Antitrust 
practitioners are sometimes encouraged to consider using arbitration 
 
134 Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing 
Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. Am. Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751–52 (1947)). 
135 See generally Steven C. Salop, What Consensus? Why Ideology and Elections Still Matter to 
Antitrust, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601 (2014). 
136 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 653 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
137 Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987). See also Baker & Stabile, supra 
note 4, at 397 (“Because it distrusted the government’s ability and willingness to enforce the new law 
vigorously, Congress established at the outset a unique bounty-hunting scheme to encourage private 
parties to enforce the Sherman Act themselves. Thus, the successful plaintiff would get treble damages 
for any loss proven, as well as reasonable lawyers’ fees and costs.”). 
138 See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos., Inc. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *4 
(S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“The Dealership Agreement prevents the recovery of ‘multiple damage’ 
and states that ‘each party shall bear its costs associated with the arbitration, including attorneys’ fees[.]’” 
(alteration in original)). 
139 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 44 (1st Cir. 2006) (ellipsis in original). 
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provisions to help their clients evade antitrust law’s mandatory treble 
damages.140 The next question, for our purposes, is whether these provisions 
are enforceable. 
An arbitrator’s power to ignore antitrust law’s dictate of treble damages 
is unclear. The Supreme Court has not directly held that parties cannot 
contractually waive the trebling provision of antitrust law.141 The Court has, 
however, held that when an arbitration clause is ambiguous as to whether it 
limits the automatic trebling provision of the relevant statute, the case must 
proceed to arbitration—not federal court—to interpret the reach and effect 
of the clause on the availability of that remedy.142 In PacifiCare Health 
Systems, Inc. v. Book, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether an 
arbitration agreement could bar a civil RICO plaintiff from seeking the treble 
damages authorized by that statute,143 holding “that the arbitrators—not the 
court—should decide in the first instance whether a particular arbitration 
agreement impermissibly limits statutory treble damages if the agreement at 
issue is ambiguous.”144 As a result, abstruse remedies limitations in an 
arbitration agreement proceed to the arbitral forum and not federal court.145 
This creates the opportunity for arbitrators to make an unreviewable 
determination that an arbitration clause precludes trebling, and consequently 
award a successful antitrust plaintiff single—not trebled—damages. 
In the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent on the waivability of 
treble damages, the decisions of the lower federal courts have been 
equivocal. One class of cases has noted that “[p]rovisions in arbitration 
 
140 Brewer, supra note 85, at 119 (“Parties also might consider providing that a successful antitrust 
claimant cannot recover treble damages or recover its attorney’s fees and litigation costs, notwithstanding 
the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).” (footnote omitted)). 
141 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 47 (“There is no Supreme Court precedent that speaks directly to the 
question of whether treble damages under federal antitrust law may be waived by contract.”). 
142 PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 n.2 (2003) (“Given our presumption in 
favor of arbitration, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983), we think the preliminary question whether the remedial limitations at issue here prohibit an award 
of RICO treble damages is not a question of arbitrability.”). 
143 RICO also has a statutory treble damages provision. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012). 
144 McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 21. 
145 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 45 (“[W]hen there is ambiguity about the scope of a remedies limitation of 
an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator will decide the question of enforceability in the first instance.” 
(citing PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 407)); In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. 
Supp. 2d 1107, 1127 (D. Kan. 2003) (“[T]he extent to which the limitation of liability on punitive or 
exemplary damages actually bans a treble damage award on plaintiffs’ antitrust claim is disputable. 
Therefore, that issue must first be resolved by the arbitrator.”); see also Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian 
Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 149 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (interpreting PacifiCare as holding that “the arbitrator 
[decides] the question whether an arbitration agreement which precluded punitive damages also barred 
treble damages under RICO”). 
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agreements that prohibit punitive damages are generally enforceable”146 and 
has considered the waivability of statutory treble damages in light of their 
similarity or lack thereof to punitive damages.147 Recent decisions have not 
treated antitrust treble damages as punitive for purposes of arbitration 
agreements,148 but some older authority does describe antitrust law’s trebling 
provision as a form of punitive damages.149 On the other hand, some federal 
courts have held that waivers of antitrust law’s provision for mandatory 
treble damages are against public policy and therefore invalid.150 Still other 
courts, however, have held that it is up to arbitrators rather than judges to 
determine whether a damage-limitation provision is unenforceable on public 
policy grounds.151 
It remains to be seen whether judges or arbitrators will police the 
availability of treble damages, whether arbitrators will in fact treble 
damages, and whether a rule requiring them to treble would—as a practical 
matter—be enforceable. Some commentary assumes that arbitrators will 
treble damages because they can.152 However, in the absence of clear 
Supreme Court precedent and a basis for meaningful appeal, “[i]t is not clear 
whether arbitration tribunals are obliged to award mandatory treble damages 
by virtue of the Clayton Act.”153 While some commentators during the 
American Safety era asserted that arbitrators could be required to treble 
 
146 Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 318 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1995)). But see In re Cotton Yarn 
Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (Johnston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Applying these principles, our sister circuits have consistently invalidated arbitration agreements that 
proscribe the arbitral award of damages guaranteed by statute.”). 
147 See, e.g., Inv. Partners, 298 F.3d at 316–18 (5th Cir. 2002). 
148 See, e.g., id. at 317 (holding that treble damages are compensatory and accordingly “the 
prohibition in the parties’ arbitration agreement against awarding ‘punitive damages’ does not extend to 
statutory treble damages”); McCallum & McCareins, supra note 69, at 21 (“[C]ourts have generally 
upheld arbitration agreements prohibiting the award of ‘punitive damages,’ but also have ruled that such 
limitations do not constrain the arbitrators’ power to award statutory treble damages.” (endnotes 
omitted)). 
149 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 61 (7th Cir. 1954) (“[T]he principal 
purpose of treble damages seems to be punishment which will deter the violator and others from future 
illegal acts.”). 
150 See, e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d at 46 (“[U]nder federal law, the remedies provided by the antitrust 
statute cannot be contractually waived.”); James C. Justice Cos., Inc. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 
2008 WL 828923, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“[T]reble damages as provided for in the Sherman 
Act is a non-waivable substantive right.”); see also Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 
1246–48 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to enforce an arbitration clause that circumvented the statutory 
remedies of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act). 
151 See Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2001) (addressing 
treble damages under RICO). 
152 See Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 34. 
153 Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 410 n.85. 
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damages,154 such a requirement would be unenforceable in light of the limited 
grounds for appealing arbitrators’ decisions, as well as the lack of any record 
in many cases to prove that the arbitrator acted improperly.155 Moreover, by 
design, arbitrators are invested with discretion, which may include the power 
to ignore trebling.156 In their quest for reaching a compromise solution, 
arbitrators may be emboldened to award single damages, instead of trebled 
damages.157 Even if the arbitration clause does not expressly waive trebling, 
the arbitrator could decide not to treble in response to defendants’ request or 
sua sponte in the name of compromise or perceived fairness. 
In sum, treble damages play a critical role in vindicating antitrust 
policy, and leaving trebling up to arbitrators would risk the continuing 
viability of that remedy. An arbitrator’s decision not to treble antitrust 
damages would ultimately undermine both the deterrence158 and 
compensation functions of federal antitrust law. The only way to ensure the 
trebling of damages is by removing antitrust claims from private arbitration 
and into public courts.159 
2. Injunctive Relief.—In  addition  to  treble  damages,  federal antitrust 
law also provides for injunctive relief when appropriate.160 In antitrust 
jurisprudence, “injunctive relief has three primary purposes: ‘(1) putting an 
end to illegal conduct, (2) depriving violators of the benefits of their illegal 
 
154 Finn, supra note 92, at 416 (“Nor would it be inconsistent with arbitration policy to require 
arbitrators to give effect to the treble damage and cost provisions.”); see also Kristian, 446 F.3d at 48 
(“[T]he arbitrator must award treble damages for a federal antitrust violation.”). 
155 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 95, at v (“Arbitrators rarely accompany awards with an 
opinion setting forth a statement of the law and an application of the law to the facts, which makes it 
difficult to understand the basis for the award.”); Finn, supra note 92, at 413 (“The merits of an award 
are not reviewable, and a court may not vacate or modify an award because of disagreement with the 
arbitrators’ interpretation of the law or facts.” (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Raytheon 
Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 322 F.2d 173, 182–83 (9th Cir. 1963); San Martine Compania De Navegacion, 
S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1961); James Richardson & Sons v. W.E. 
Hedger Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1938))). 
156 Pitofsky, supra note 107, at 1079 (“A key technique devised by Congress to encourage private 
antitrust litigation and enlarge penalties against those found to have violated the antitrust laws are the 
provisions calling for mandatory treble damages and attorney’s fees for the plaintiff. In the ordinary 
commercial arbitration, neither of those statutory provisions would be binding on the arbitrator.”). 
157 Fuglsang, supra note 111, at 815 (“Because arbitration is designed primarily to reach a fair 
settlement or compromise between the parties, arbitrators are more likely to award only actual damages 
rather than the statutorily mandated treble damages.”). 
158 Mark R. Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1987). 
159 Cf. Pitofsky, supra note 107, at 1079 (“[A] binding referral to arbitration (where rights to treble 
damages and attorneys’ fees could not be secure) . . . should be unenforceable.”). 
160 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012). Both government and private plaintiffs can request injunctions to remedy 
antitrust violations. Id. §§ 25–26. 
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conduct, and (3) restoring competition in the marketplace.’”161 As with treble 
damages, Congress created “injunctive remedies . . . not merely to provide 
private relief, but . . . to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the 
antitrust laws.”162 Unlike damages, however, injunctive relief “is 
characteristically available even though the plaintiff has not yet suffered 
actual injury; he need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an 
impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation 
likely to continue or recur.”163 
Antitrust arbitration has the potential to undermine the injunctive relief 
component of private antitrust enforcement. In theory, “[a]rbitrators enjoy 
broad equitable powers . . . [to] grant whatever remedy is necessary to right 
the wrongs within their jurisdiction.”164 Some arbitration clauses explicitly 
provide that an arbitrator may issue an injunction.165 In practice, however, 
potential antitrust defendants can easily draft their arbitration clauses to 
preclude any arbitrator from granting the plaintiff injunctive relief.166 
The possibility of antitrust defendants using arbitration clauses to 
prevent injunctions is alarming because equitable remedies are often 
important in private antitrust lawsuits.167 Federal judges can structure 
antitrust injunctions to eliminate the “lingering effects” of illegal 
anticompetitive conduct.168 In contrast, private arbitrators have less incentive 
and less institutional competence to impose, monitor, and enforce sweeping 
injunctive relief to restore and maintain competitive markets. 
  
 
161 Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1059 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting 
In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 538 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
162 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130–31 (1969). 
163 Id. at 130 (citation omitted). 
164 HCI Techs, Inc., v. Avaya, Inc., 241 F. App’x 115, 125 n.12 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 
1990), aff’d, 500 U.S. 20 (1991)). 
165 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
166 James J. Calder et al., A New Alternative to Antitrust Litigation: Arbitration of Antitrust Disputes, 
ANTITRUST, Spring 1989, at 18, 19–20 (explaining that “parties to an arbitration generally . . . can limit 
the remedies available” and arguing that “[t]he attraction of arbitration may be further enhanced if the 
remedies available to the arbitrators are limited so as to exclude injunctive relief”). 
167 See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(finding antitrust action qualified for class certification “[b]ecause the highly significant injunctive relief 
sought here is as important as the damages claimed”). 
168 See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 366–67 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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3. Attorneys’  Fees  and  Costs.—Antitrust  law’s  statutory  regime  is 
unusual in that it requires the successful private plaintiff—but not the 
successful defendant—to receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.169 
Like trebling, the award of attorneys’ fees to successful antitrust plaintiffs is 
mandatory.170 This automatic award of attorneys’ fees facilitates the policy 
goals of “both encourag[ing] ‘private prosecution of antitrust violations by 
insulating plaintiffs’ treble damage recoveries from the expense of legal fees’ 
and deter[ring] violation of the antitrust laws by requiring a losing defendant 
to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees ‘as part of his penalty for having violated 
the antitrust laws.’”171 The compulsory award of costs to antitrust victims 
vindicates “the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws 
through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action.”172 
Despite this statutory command, arbitration clauses often require that 
both winners and losers pay their own attorneys’ fees,173 thus attempting to 
override antitrust law’s mandatory fee-shifting provision for successful 
antitrust plaintiffs. Unlike federal judges, arbitrators are not necessarily 
forced to follow antitrust law’s statutory mandate of fee shifting when the 
plaintiffs prevail.174 Courts in some non-antitrust cases have invalidated 
arbitration clauses that purported to deny a successful plaintiff recovery of 
statutorily mandated reasonable attorneys’ fees.175 The validity of anti-fee-
shifting arbitration clauses in antitrust disputes was unsettled even prior to 
Italian Colors. Some antitrust courts used the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
to invalidate such contract provisions on the grounds that a “ban on the 
recovery of attorney’s fees and costs . . . would burden Plaintiffs . . . with 
prohibitive arbitration costs, preventing Plaintiffs from vindicating their 
 
169 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”). 
170 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 261 (1975) (“Under the antitrust 
laws, for instance, allowance of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff awarded treble damages is mandatory.”). 
171 Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Home 
Placement Serv. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1210 (1st Cir. 1987); Farmington Dowel 
Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 90 (1st Cir. 1969)). 
172 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 653 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955)). 
173 See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 
arbitration clause expressly forfeits Graham Oil’s statutorily-mandated right to recover reasonable 
attorney’s fees from ARCO if Graham Oil prevails on certain claims. The clause provides that each party 
will bear its own attorney’s fees.”). 
174 See Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 428 (suggesting that “the arbitrator might be given broad 
discretion to allocate fees and costs”). 
175 See Brewer, supra note 85, at 119–20. 
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statutory rights in arbitration.”176 However, other pre-Italian Colors courts 
upheld arbitration clauses that preclude any arbitrator from awarding 
attorneys’ fees to a successful antitrust plaintiff.177 
Some arbitration clauses go further and include double-edged fee-
shifting provisions that require the unsuccessful antitrust plaintiff to pay the 
defendants’ costs.178 Such an approach can deter frivolous litigation,179 but it 
can also deter valid antitrust suits.180 The drafters of American antitrust law 
explicitly rejected the English rule—where the losing party pays the 
reasonable attorneys’ fees of both sides—in favor of a one-sided fee-shifting 
regime in which only successful plaintiffs benefit. Arbitration clauses that 
seek to impose the English rule are inconsistent with the clear text of antitrust 
statutes and may deter victims of antitrust violations from bringing valid 
claims. 
Fee-shifting for successful antitrust plaintiffs is particularly important 
for equitable cases brought under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff 
seeking injunctive relief must recover its costs if successful; otherwise, even 
if it wins, it is essentially paying for an injunction (of perhaps dubious 
strength) to get the defendant to follow the law. When Congress was 
considering the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,181 
the House Report noted: 
[T]he need for the awarding of attorneys’ fees in § 16 injunction cases is greater 
than the need in § 4 treble damage cases. In damage cases, a prevailing plaintiff 
recovers compensation, at least. In injunction cases, however, without the 
shifting of attorneys’ fees, a plaintiff with a deserving case would personally 
have to pay the very high price of obtaining judicial enforcement of the law and 
of the important national policies the antitrust laws reflect. A prevailing plaintiff 
should not have to bear such an expense. Section 3(3) of H.R. 8532, therefore, 
is intended to reiterate congressional encouragement for private parties to bring 
and maintain meritorious antitrust injunction cases. Under this section, a 
 
176 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2006). In Kristian, the court severed the 
fee clause because the governing contract had a savings clause. Id. at 53. 
177 See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos., v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *5 
(S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“[The plaintiff] has offered no evidence that paying its own attorney’s fees 
and costs in arbitration would prevent it from effectively vindicating its rights under the Sherman Act. 
Therefore, Court cannot conclude that the Dealership Agreement’s limitation on attorney’s fees and costs 
is inconsistent with the policies of the Sherman Act.”). 
178 See, e.g., In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2012). 
179 Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 428. 
180 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 35, at 635 (noting that a fee-shifting provision can chill 
plaintiffs from bringing suit); id. at 645 (“[B]ounty and fee-shifting clauses are plainly intended to avoid 
liability and not to select an alternative forum for the resolution of disputes.”). 
181 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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plaintiff who substantially prevails would be entitled to the award of 
“reasonable attorneys’ fees.”182 
Absent fee-shifting, given the cost and uncertainty of antitrust adjudication, 
the victims of an antitrust violation may have insufficient incentive to pursue 
an equitable remedy.183 If so, antitrust violations would become more 
profitable, and thus, more likely. 
For the same reasons that antitrust defendants should not be able to 
detreble antitrust damages through a cleverly worded limitation clause in an 
arbitration agreement, neither should they be able to nullify the Sherman 
Act’s attorneys’ fees provision by the same means. Treble damages and the 
automatic award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to successful 
antitrust plaintiffs serve the same function and neither should be 
circumvented through arbitration.184 
4. Statutes of Limitations.—Federal antitrust law provides a four-year 
statute of limitations.185 Prior to 1955, because federal antitrust statutes did 
not define a limitations period, federal courts used “the most analogous state 
statute of limitations” to determine the filing deadline for private antitrust 
actions.186 In 1955, Congress amended the Clayton Act to establish a uniform 
four-year statute of limitations for all private antitrust claims.187 This is a 
relatively generous period that facilitates private causes of action.188 Four 
years affords potential antitrust plaintiffs sufficient time to discover 
violations and investigate their claims before filing suit, which is particularly 
important given that the Supreme Court has significantly increased the 
 
182 F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 476 F. Supp. 203, 205 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(quoting 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2589). 
183 Baker, supra note 127, at 386 (“[T]he one-way cost rule seems most important . . . in equity cases 
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. The fact that such a plaintiff can recover costs is definitely an 
incentive to seek an injunction.”). 
184 Indeed, they share the same sentence of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
185 Id. § 15b. 
186 In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 289 (4th Cir. 2007). 
187 Id. 
188 Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012) (“No action shall be 
maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within one year after the 
discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.”); 
Telecommunications Act § 415, 47 U.S.C. § 415 (two-year statute of limitations); DelCostello v. Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983) (“[Section] 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act . . . 
establishes a 6-month period for making charges of unfair labor practices to the NLRB.”); Onyx Props. 
LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Elbert Cty., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167–68 (D. Colo. 2012) (“[A]ll 
actions upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of limitation is provided in said federal 
statute . . . shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.” (ellipsis in original) 
(quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102(1)(g) (2012)). 
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burden that antitrust plaintiffs must overcome to survive a motion to 
dismiss.189 
In drafting their contracts with suppliers and consumers, potential 
antitrust defendants have crafted and included arbitration clauses that 
significantly shorten the statute of limitations for antitrust claims. For 
example, many businesses have employed contract terms that require any 
arbitration to be initiated within one year of “the event or facts giving rise to 
a dispute.”190 Private agreements to abbreviate statutory limitations periods 
conflict with legislative determinations of the appropriate amount of time to 
afford plaintiffs to bring suit. 
Courts vary in their willingness to enforce arbitration agreements that 
truncate statutes of limitations. Some states prohibit contractual shortening 
of statutes of limitation,191 but others do not.192 Some federal judges have 
proven receptive to antitrust defendants shortening the statute of limitations 
through arbitration provisions,193 and courts have rejected claims that 
arbitration clauses that significantly reduce a statute of limitations make 
antitrust claims nonarbitrable.194 
Some courts have treated plaintiffs’ arguments against truncated 
statutes of limitations with hostility, belittling them as “little more than an 
observation that the limitations period under the arbitration agreements is 
shorter than that provided by federal law and the unremarkable recognition 
that limitations provisions affect the amount of damages that may be 
recovered.”195 In rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments, federal courts have asserted 
that statutes of limitations present issues of procedure, not substantive 
antitrust law.196 Judges have reasoned that in creating the four-year statute of 
 
189 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
190 See, e.g., Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 287 (“The arbitration agreements . . . establish a one-year 
period in which claims must be brought.”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he 2002/2003 arbitration agreements state that ‘you must contact us within one (1) year of the date 
of the occurrence of the event or facts giving rise to a dispute . . . or you waive the right to pursue a claim 
based upon such event, facts or dispute.’” (ellipsis in original)). 
191 See Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 287 n.8 (noting South Carolina law). 
192 See id. (noting North Carolina law). 
193 Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 35 (“[A]n arbitration agreement that requires the parties to 
file their claim within one year after becoming aware of a claim has been held enforceable, even when 
the statute of limitations period would otherwise be longer.” (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826–27 (S.D. Ohio 1999))); see, e.g., James C. Justice Cos. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-
cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (enforcing a mandatory arbitration clause 
with a two-year statute of limitations because the plaintiff had brought its claim within two years). 
194 See, e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d at 44 (“[W]e conclude that Plaintiffs’ challenge to the statute of 
limitations contained in the 2002/2003 Policies & Practices does not raise a question of arbitrability.”). 
195 Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 288. 
196 See id. at 289 (“And the Eighth Circuit, in a case decided not long after § 15b was enacted (but 
which did not involve questions of arbitration), likewise viewed the limitations period as procedural rather 
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limitations, Congress merely intended to create a uniform statute of 
limitations for federal antitrust claims to replace the patchwork of state 
statutes of limitations that federal courts had been using in the absence of a 
specified federal statute of limitations for antitrust claims.197 For example, 
the Fourth Circuit in Cotton Yarn asserted: 
If Congress was content for so long to permit antitrust plaintiffs to be subject to 
different limitations periods (which of course affected the amount of damages 
that could be recovered), it seems difficult to conclude that Congress, by merely 
establishing a uniform limitations period, intended to vest plaintiffs in all 
antitrust cases with a substantive and non-waivable right to wait four years 
before bringing suit and to recover a full four years’ worth of damages.198 
Cotton Yarn assumed that Congress was solely concerned with uniformity 
and not protecting the substantive rights of antitrust plaintiffs with a 
generous statute of limitations.199 Furthermore, the Clayton Act does not 
explicitly forbid parties from shortening the four-year statute of 
limitations.200 Consequently, according to the Fourth Circuit, parties can use 
arbitration clauses to shorten the antitrust limitations period because doing 
so is not a waiver of any substantive rights.201 
The argument that Congress wasn’t creating a substantive right when it 
established antitrust’s statute of limitations is suspect for at least two reasons. 
First, it ignores the fact that Congress made the uniform statute of limitations 
for federal antitrust claims four years, which is relatively long. This suggests 
that Congress’s concern went beyond uniformity—that it also wanted to 
preclude shorter state statutes from interfering with effective antitrust 
enforcement. Second, Congress chose not to create uniformity when it 
decided not to preempt longer state antitrust statutes of limitations.202 The 
decision not to exercise its preemptory powers meant Congress allowed for 
 
than substantive. See Kansas City v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 282–83 (8th Cir. 1962). We also 
believe that § 15b should not be viewed as establishing substantive rights.”); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 43 
(describing statute of limitations as a procedural issue). 
197 See Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 289 n.9 (discussing legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 15b). But see 
id. at 298–99 (Johnston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I would hold that the four-year 
limitations period contained in 15 U.S.C. § 15b is a non-waivable substantive right, and that the purported 
waiver of this right would, in this case, prevent the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory 
rights.”). 
198 Id. at 289. 
199 Id. at 289 n.9. 
200 Id. at 287. 
201 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 808 (7th ed. 2012) (“The 
limitations period, however, is not considered a substantive element of the federal antitrust laws, and thus 
the period may be shortened by contract.”). 
202 Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 367 n.3 (D. Conn. 1979) (discussing Ohio 
ex rel. Brown v. Klosterman French Baking Co., No. C-1-75-338, 1976 WL 1373 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 
1976)). 
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disuniformity regarding supplemental state antitrust claims. The Sixth 
Circuit has explained that “[s]ince Congress was well aware that there were 
state antitrust laws in effect and chose not to preempt them, we believe that 
neither did it intend to preempt anything in them, including statutes of 
limitations . . . .”203 Far from preempting these state laws with longer statute 
of limitations, “Congress recognized and approved state antitrust statutes of 
limitations, including those longer than four years.”204 That suggests 
Congress intended to impose a minimum period for antitrust enforcement. 
Even where courts permit agreements to truncate limitations periods, 
antitrust defendants do not enjoy unlimited power to shorten the statute of 
limitations. Under Cotton Yarn, for example, an arbitration clause cannot 
mandate a limitations period that is “unreasonably short.”205 The opinion, 
however, suggests that this is unlikely to be a meaningful constraint in the 
antitrust context. Invoking non-antitrust examples, the Fourth Circuit held 
that arbitration clauses that shorten the antitrust statute of limitations to just 
one year are reasonable.206 This conclusion is suspect given the realities of 
antitrust litigation. A one-year statute of limitations would afford antitrust 
plaintiffs scarce time to develop facts sufficient to satisfy Twombly’s new 
higher pleading standard for antitrust cases.207 Discovering the fact of a cartel 
may take time, and collecting evidence sufficient to satisfy Twombly may 
take yet more time. But in the new world of arbitration, plaintiffs may be 
forced to bring underdeveloped cases or risk losing their claims forever. 
Even with respect to those claims that plaintiffs manage to bring within 
such a narrowed time frame, allowing potential antitrust defendants to 
truncate the statute of limitations could seriously undermine antitrust policy 
by significantly reducing the damages awarded to successful antitrust 
plaintiffs. Because antitrust damages are generally calculated for the period 
of activity covered by the applicable statute of limitations, shortening the 
statute of limitations can also reduce the damages available to a successful 
 
203 Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1482 (6th Cir. 1988). 
204 Brown, 1976 WL 1373, at *5. 
205 Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 287; see also Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 35 (“Parties generally 
have the power to shorten a statute of limitations by contract, so long as the agreement is reasonable under 
the circumstances.”). 
206 Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 287 (“Courts have frequently found contractual limitations periods of 
one year (or less) to be reasonable.”). 
207 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Arbitrators, too, can grant a quasi-
motion to dismiss. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 25 (2014), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased 
[https://perma.cc/E242-3YAG]. 
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antitrust plaintiff.208 Courts have been less sympathetic towards this 
argument than they have been towards efforts to avoid waiver of treble 
damages. While some courts have suggested that arbitration clauses banning 
treble damages may be unenforceable because the “right to recover treble 
damages is a substantive right,”209 they have permitted truncating the statute 
of limitations from four years to one.210 
This is incongruous because a one-year statute of limitations may 
reduce damages—and thus undermine the deterrence and compensation 
goals of antitrust law—more than detrebling. Detrebling cuts damages by 
two-thirds, but reducing the statute of limitations from four years to one can 
cut damages by three-fourths. Courts elevate the “particular type of 
damages” over “the amount of the award”211 despite the fact that it is the 
amount of damages that determines compensation and deterrence, not the 
label attached to those damages. Invoking the procedure-versus-substance 
mantra, the Fourth Circuit has held that defendants can use arbitration 
clauses to significantly reduce the successful antitrust plaintiff’s recovery: 
“[W]e cannot conclude that the arbitral forum is inadequate or inaccessible 
merely because the plaintiff may recover a lesser quantum of damages than 
he might have in a judicial forum.”212 The court failed to appreciate that this 
undermines the deterrent effect of the antitrust regime.213 
In allowing antitrust defendants to shorten the statute of limitations, 
some courts have pointed to the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as 
sufficient to protect antitrust plaintiffs.214 Applying this doctrine means that 
if an antitrust plaintiff can establish that the defendant wrongfully concealed 
its antitrust violation215 and that the plaintiff exercised due diligence, then the 
 
208 See Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 299–300 (Johnston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[W]hile the Antitrust Act effectively requires a four year look-back period, the contract at issue would 
only allow the arbitrator to consider one year of anti-competitive behavior.”). 
209 Id. at 288 (majority opinion) (discussing Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 
2006)). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 300–01 (Johnston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
212 Id. at 290 (majority opinion). 
213 See Christopher M. Huber, Summary, In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litigation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 
1177, 1187–88 (2009) (“[P]unishing the defendants for only one year of anti-competitive activity would 
not have the same deterrent effect as holding them accountable for the entire four year statutory period 
and likely would not fully compensate the plaintiffs.”). 
214 Cotton Yarn, 505 F.3d at 291 (“The plaintiffs’ contention that a one-year limitations period would 
prevent them from proceeding on their antitrust claims also fails to account for the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment, which is read into all federal statutes of limitations, including § 15b . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
215 “In the absence of a fiduciary duty or other affirmative obligation to make disclosure, the 
defendant’s silence also is not enough.” 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 201, at 816–17 
(footnote omitted). 
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statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the antitrust 
violation.216 The statute of limitations is “tolled” until one or the other occurs. 
In federal antitrust cases, the antitrust plaintiff is then afforded “the full four-
year period” provided by the antitrust statute to bring a claim.217 Cotton Yarn 
concluded that a one-year period for bringing an arbitration claim was 
sufficient in part because the year wouldn’t start running until the plaintiffs 
had learned of the defendant’s antitrust violations.218 
Tolling could affect the analysis. Cotton Yarn assumed that tolling 
applies to claims brought in arbitration. The doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment is read into otherwise silent federal statutes, and some courts 
have applied it to antitrust arbitration claims in the absence of objections 
from the defendant.219 Thus, in theory, the tolling provisions of antitrust law 
can expand antitrust plaintiffs’ period for filing a lawsuit beyond the 
truncated statute of limitations found in an arbitration clause.220 Some 
arbitration provisions, however, attempt to prohibit equitable tolling, 
effectively converting a statute of limitations into a statute of repose that 
cannot be tolled.221 If arbitrators enforce these contract terms, antitrust 
plaintiffs can be out of luck without any recourse. 
Prior to Italian Colors, at least, the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
served as a moderating influence on efforts to use arbitration clauses to limit 
substantive rights.222 If the shortening of the limitations period prevents the 
plaintiff from effectively vindicating its rights, that could undermine the 
enforceability of the arbitration clause.223 At a minimum, provisions to 
truncate the limitations period should be severed from the arbitration 
 
216 Id. at 816 (collecting cases). 
217 Id. 
218 505 F.3d at 291  
219 See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04MD1622, 2009 WL 618252, at *4 (M.D.N.C. 
Mar. 6, 2009) (“Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs’ contention that the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment applies.”). 
220 Traditionally, the tolling provisions effectively lengthen the antitrust statute of limitations. Milton 
Handler, Antitrust—1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1411–12 (1978). 
221 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 382 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1587, 1591 (1993) (explaining statutes of repose). 
222 See Cotton Yarn, 2009 WL 618252, at *4 (“The Court therefore concludes that the contractual 
one-year limitations period set forth in the arbitration agreements at issue does not prevent Plaintiffs from 
proceeding with their antitrust claims in the arbitral forum, and furthermore, that the arbitration 
agreements at issue in this case do not prevent Plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory 
rights.”). 
223 See Huber, supra note 213, at 1183–84 (“[T]he court considered whether, if the plaintiffs’ claims 
were held untimely under the arbitration agreements, it would prevent the plaintiffs from effectively 
vindicating their statutory rights.”). 
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agreement.224 With the weakening of the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
affected by Italian Colors, antitrust defendants will be more tempted to use 
arbitration clauses to significantly truncate statutes of limitations and thus 
reduce expected damages from antitrust violations.225 
C. Class Actions 
Class action litigation is a critical part of the antitrust enforcement 
regime. Class actions make it possible for thousands of victims of an antitrust 
violation to collectively seek relief for damage awards that would be too 
small to justify the cost of pursuing in individual litigation.226 In theory, class-
wide arbitration could serve this same aggregating function.227 The Supreme 
Court, however, has been skeptical of class arbitration, in part because of the 
lack of review, which hurts the losing defendant considerably when 
thousands of claims are aggregated into one high-stakes adjudication.228 
Many arbitration clauses explicitly preclude both class action litigation 
and class-wide arbitration.229 This is highly advantageous for potential 
antitrust defendants, because eliminating class action litigation and class 
arbitration may—as a practical matter—eliminate liability. By requiring that 
their customers waive any right to participate in a class action, antitrust 
 
224 See In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 301 (4th Cir. 2007) (Johnston, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
225 Cf. Brewer, supra note 85, at 119 (“Parties might be tempted, for example, to include provisions 
providing that an antitrust claim must be brought within an abbreviated time period or it is waived, 
notwithstanding the four-year statute of limitations prescribed in 15 U.S.C. § 15(b).”). 
 Complicating the issue further is who decides the issue. Arbitration clauses sometimes provide that 
the issue of whether the truncated statute of limitations is permissible should be submitted to the court, 
not the arbitrator. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (M.D.N.C. 2005), vacated, 
505 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2007). But that is not required by law and if an arbitration agreement were to 
reserve this question for the arbitrator, this would substantially undermine the Effective Vindication 
Doctrine because the arbitrator is not bound by the law in the same manner as a federal judge. 
226 See Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling, supra note 129, at 1011–12 (noting that most 
price-fixing cases are brought as class actions). 
227 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has developed class arbitration procedures, which 
largely mimic Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1751 (2011). The Supreme Court has suggested that arbitrators may not be up to the task of adjudicating 
the legal issues involved in class procedures, such as certification. Id. at 1750. It seems to hold that 
arbitrators are smart enough to decide complicated antitrust matters, but not to understand class 
certification. 
228 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662, 684–87 (2010). The Supreme Court has not, however, expressed a similar concern about the losing 
plaintiff. The Court seems to only care about arbitration error and lack of review when it could hurt the 
defendant. For a discussion of the increasing challenges facing antitrust class actions, see Spencer Weber 
Waller, The Fall and Rise of the Antitrust Class Action (working paper August 10, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641867 [http://perma.cc/8YZE-QCYE]. 
229 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (“The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes 
between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties’ ‘individual capacity, and not as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.’”). 
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defendants prevent the “spreading across multiple plaintiffs the costs of 
experts, depositions, neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements[, which] forces 
the individual claimant to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter 
the bringing of claims.”230 Even if individual arbitration is cheaper than 
individual litigation, arbitration is still prohibitively expensive for a lone 
plaintiff to pursue an antitrust claim, as demonstrated by the facts of Italian 
Colors.231 As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “[t]he realistic alternative to a 
class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as 
only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”232 With class actions barred, pursuing 
individual arbitration would be irrational, and antitrust violators would have 
functionally immunized themselves from private suit.233 
Arbitration clauses that prohibit litigating or arbitrating as a class thwart 
both the substantive and procedural laws that Congress designed to protect 
consumers. Substantively, class action waivers undermine the effective 
vindication of rights, as the First Circuit has recognized: “[A] bar on class 
arbitration threatens the premise that arbitration can be ‘a fair and adequate 
mechanism for enforcing statutory rights.’”234 Procedurally, the primary 
reason that Congress created the class action vehicle was “to overcome the 
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual 
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”235 Many, if not most, 
individuals will not have the resources to mount an individual case.236 
Antitrust suits are particularly expensive for plaintiffs to bring because of the 
necessity for economic experts, whose fees can dwarf an individual 
claimant’s damages.237 In many cases, it would be irrational for either victims 
of antitrust violations or their attorneys to pursue individual litigation or 
arbitration.238 Consequently, class action waivers significantly undermine the 
 
230 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern 
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2005). 
231 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he expense involved in proving the claim in arbitration is ten times what Italian Colors could hope 
to gain, even in a best-case scenario.”); supra Section I.C. Concepcion provides another example. See 
131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the 
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”). 
232 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
233 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“No rational actor would bring a 
claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”). 
234 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
235 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
236 See, e.g., Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54–55. 
237 Id. at 58. 
238 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 699 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“When adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more than modest in size, class 
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deterrent effects and compensatory function of antitrust law.239 They may 
also prevent the continued development of that substantive law by replacing 
precedential court decisions with private arbitration rulings.240 
Class action waivers are likely to become more prevalent.241 In addition, 
mandatory arbitration provisions may bind individual class members, 
preventing them from asserting rights on behalf of the class or forcing those 
claims to arbitration.242 Before Concepcion and Italian Colors, several courts 
had invalidated class action waivers.243 In Italian Colors, however, Justice 
Scalia belittled the importance of antitrust class actions, asserting that “the 
individual suit that was considered adequate to assure ‘effective vindication’ 
of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did not suddenly 
become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”244 Justice Scalia’s 
contention is flawed for two reasons. First, the Effective Vindication 
Doctrine postdates the federal class action. Second, and more importantly, 
Congress created the class action vehicle precisely because victims could not 
vindicate their rights through individual lawsuits. 
Furthermore, some arbitration clauses forbid not only class actions, but 
all coordination among the victims of an antitrust violation. Arbitration 
 
proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them, potential claimants will have little, if any, incentive to 
seek vindication of their rights.”); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59 (citing Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, 
Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable 
Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 85–86 (2004)). 
239 See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 725 (2012) (“If we allow companies to insulate themselves from class actions, we 
are effectively allowing companies to escape many legal regulations and thereby eliminating a great 
deterrent to company misconduct.”). 
240 See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, The End of Doctrine: Private Arbitration, Public Law and the Anti-
Lawsuit Movement 33–35, 37–40 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Cardozo Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 436), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488575 [http://perma.cc/3CMP-
KHKS]. 
241 Sternlight, supra note 239, at 718 (“In the near future, we can expect that even more companies 
will impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class actions because 
Concepcion has changed the calculus.”); James Parrinello, Arbitration at the Tipping Point: Challenging 
Claim-Suppressing Arbitration Clauses, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2014) (arguing that companies have a 
strong incentive to include class action waivers in their contracts with consumers). 
242 In Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc., for instance, the court granted a motion to compel 
arbitration of Nitsch’s class action antitrust claim against his employer for conspiring with its competitors 
to enter into “no-hire” agreements, on the theory that Nitsch’s employment agreement required arbitration 
and his antitrust claims arose out of his employment. No. 14-CV-4062-LHK, 2015 WL 1886882, at *9–
10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015). Notably, the court declined to compel arbitration of his claims against other 
defendants in the conspiracy, but the effect was still to send part of his (and therefore the class’s) antitrust 
claims to arbitration. Id. at *10; see also In re Cox Enters. Inc. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust 
Litig., No. 12-ML-2048-C, 2014 WL 104964, at *2–3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2015) (granting motion to 
arbitrate class antitrust claim), appeal docketed, No. 15-6076 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2015). 
243 See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 697 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing cases). 
244 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
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clauses commonly contain confidentiality requirements.245 This purported 
advantage of arbitration is quite disadvantageous for antitrust plaintiffs, 
however, because it can prevent cost sharing or even information sharing 
among the victims of antitrust violations. For example, the agreement at 
issue in Italian Colors precluded the plaintiffs from even informally 
arranging among themselves to pay for a common expert report that each 
could use in his or her individual arbitration proceeding.246 Such 
consolidation would be absolutely necessary in the absence of class 
actions—which the contract also explicitly prohibited—because no 
individual victim alone could afford to pay for an expert report.247 As Justice 
Kagan noted in dissent, the agreement imposed by American Express “cut[] 
off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking 
necessary costs. [American Express] has put Italian Colors to this choice: 
Spend way, way, way more money than your claim is worth, or relinquish 
your Sherman Act rights.”248 Despite the proffered efficiency justifications 
for arbitration, this provision was designed to create inefficiency in order to 
make claims against the defendant cost-prohibitive. 
Further, while an antitrust defendant who loses a lawsuit in court to one 
plaintiff will ordinarily be collaterally estopped from contesting the issues 
decided in the first case in a subsequent suit,249 offensive nonmutual 
collateral estoppel does not necessarily apply to arbitration proceedings. 
Some courts have held that parties are not bound by the results of prior 
arbitrations in a subsequent arbitration unless they agree to be so bound.250 
Moreover, even if parties were formally bound with respect to issues decided 
by prior arbitrators, practical considerations may make the application of 
collateral estoppel in this context unlikely. Since arbitrations are 
confidential, a plaintiff may never find out about the outcome of a prior 
arbitration.251 And even if a plaintiff seeks to learn of the prior case in 
 
245 Philip Rothman, Pssst, Please Keep It Confidential: Arbitration Makes It Possible, DISP. RESOL. 
J., Sept. 1994, at 69, 70–71. 
246 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The agreement also disallows any kind of joinder or 
consolidation of claims or parties. And more: Its confidentiality provision prevents Italian Colors from 
informally arranging with other merchants to produce a common expert report.”). 
247 See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text. 
248 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
249 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332–33 (1979). 
250 See, e.g., LaSalla v. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 898 A.2d 803, 812 (Conn. 2006) (“In the absence of 
a specific contractual provision governing the issue, for which the parties are certainly free to bargain, 
arbitrators are not required to apply claim preclusion; rather, they are free to apply or reject the doctrine 
to the extent that they deem it appropriate because the parties have bargained for their judgment.”). 
251 James M. Westerlind, The Preclusive Effect of Arbitration Awards, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: 
REINSURANCE, Aug. 20, 2010, at 1, 6 (“As a practical matter, a non-party to the first arbitration may not 
know of the resulting award. Most arbitrations are confidential, and only the award itself, which may not 
include a finding of facts, is usually made a matter of public record when a party moves to confirm. In 
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discovery, some kinds of arbitration agreements provide that the results of 
prior arbitrations do not have to be disclosed.252 The result is that not only 
must each plaintiff bring an arbitration on his or her own, but that each and 
every plaintiff may have to relitigate the very issues that previous plaintiffs 
have already proven. The practical effect of such a requirement is to make 
vindication of antitrust rights even more cost prohibitive, and hence even 
more unlikely. 
To be sure, class actions have their share of problems, and have been 
abused in various circumstances.253 But problems with class actions are not 
a reason to abolish them altogether in antitrust cases. And even if they should 
be abolished, it is policymakers rather than self-interested defendants who 
should make that decision. 
D. Conclusion 
The combination of all of these factors means that as large companies 
increasingly impose arbitration agreements on antitrust plaintiffs, the 
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement will decline across every dimension—
the process used, the remedies available, and the ability to consolidate or 
even rely on related cases. Antitrust rights cannot effectively be vindicated 
in a world in which all or most antitrust plaintiffs are functionally barred 
from taking their cases to court.254 
  
 
addition, an arbitration award may never be confirmed if the losing party simply pays, or the prevailing 
party, owing nothing, chooses to not file a motion for the purpose.”). 
252 Id. (“[A]n ‘honorable engagement’ clause in the parties’ arbitration agreement may be relied upon 
by the panel in a subsequent arbitration to disallow the introduction of a prior arbitration award or to 
ignore it if it is introduced.”). 
253 E.g., Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and 
Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 994 (2002) (explaining that coupon-based 
class action settlements “illustrate how defendants have structured class action settlements to maximize 
the gains for the corporate defendant while minimizing any compensation to the class”). 
254 Arbitration applies only in cases of privity, so in theory there might remain some antitrust 
plaintiffs that have never done business directly with the defendant and so have not been bound to an 
arbitration agreement with them. In practice, however, that is unlikely for two reasons. First, courts have 
been willing to enforce even standard-form arbitration agreements included in clickwrap or shrinkwrap 
licenses. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006) [hereinafter Lemley, 
Terms of Use]. Therefore, many large retailers may have bound virtually everyone in the country to this 
new, attenuated form of “contract.” Second, and more important, federal antitrust law permits suit only 
by direct purchasers, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977), and those direct purchasers are 
the very ones most likely to have entered into a contract directly with the defendant. For an argument that 
the direct purchaser rule at least must change after Italian Colors, see Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. 
Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2115 (2015). 
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III. ANTITRUST ARBITRATION IN A CONCENTRATED MARKET 
The proliferation of antitrust arbitration undermines the antitrust 
enforcement regime. Market concentration exacerbates the downsides of 
mandatory arbitration because firms without competitors are more likely to 
impose onerous terms, such as arbitration clauses, on their customers. 
Because antitrust violations often occur in concentrated markets—or cause 
markets to become concentrated—antitrust violators may have more ability 
to effectively require consumers to waive their rights to litigate as a condition 
of doing business. When antitrust violators impose arbitration clauses, the 
premise of mandatory arbitration—that informed consumers voluntarily 
agree to arbitrate—is not met. Mergers worsen the problem because they can 
result in a market dominated by a single firm or an oligopoly. In either 
scenario, the surviving market players will have enhanced their ability to 
contract around antitrust liability. A single dominant firm may be able to 
impose onerous terms like mandatory individual arbitration on its customers, 
and a small number of firms remaining in a concentrated market post-merger 
will be better able to explicitly or tacitly coordinate the imposition of such 
arbitration clauses on an industry-wide basis. 
In praising the benefits of arbitration—and enforcing arbitration clauses 
as voluntarily entered into—federal judges implicitly assume a competitive 
marketplace in which arbitration clauses are freely negotiated between the 
contracting parties. Historically, private arbitration arose as a dispute 
resolution mechanism for commercial actors of relatively equal bargaining 
power.255 In enacting the FAA, Congress envisioned scenarios “primarily 
where merchants sought to resolve disputes of fact, not law, under the 
customs of their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent 
bargaining power.”256 Equal bargaining power is a consequence of 
competitive markets—markets in which a seller can turn to many buyers and 
buyers can purchase from other sellers. 
Courts operate as though this model of equal parties agreeing to 
arbitrate still prevails. For example, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
“the consensual nature” of arbitration, noting that both “parties are ‘generally 
 
255 Leslie, supra note 5; Morris Stone, A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration, 21 ARB. 
J. 156, 162 (1966) (“The founders of the American arbitration movement thought almost exclusively in 
terms of transactions between parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and of contracts 
specifically drafted for each occasion.”). 
256 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1758 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
legislative history of the FAA). Early cases allowing arbitration of antitrust claims involved commercial 
contracts between firms, not consumer contracts. Scott S. Megregian & Todd Babbitz, The Use of 
Mandatory Arbitration to Defeat Antitrust Class Actions, ANTITRUST, Summer 1999, at 63, 66 (“A review 
of the decided cases shows that almost all arbitration clauses that have been upheld involved negotiated 
contracts between ‘sophisticated’ parties. To date, these cases have tended to involve disputes over 
‘vertical’ restraints between manufacturers and distributors.”). 
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free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.’”257 When 
enforcing arbitration clauses, courts assume a free, competitive marketplace 
in which consumers can turn to other sources of the product.258 This 
assumption is critical because the consumers’ ability to reject the arbitration 
clause is dependent on being able to purchase the product from a supplier 
that does not require consumers to waive their rights to sue in federal court.259 
Absent that alternative supplier, consumers purchasing the necessities of life 
have no ability to avoid mandatory arbitration. Courts do not necessarily 
appreciate the absence of consumer choice.260 Economists, too, argue that in 
competitive markets consumers must be receiving some form of 
compensation—such as a price discount—for foregoing their right to sue in 
federal court.261 But this assumes that a competitive market exists, that 
consumers are well-informed about the details of multi-page contracts they 
may never see, and that consumers have sufficient bargaining power to play 
suppliers off of each other. Such market conditions do not exist in many 
industries that impose mandatory arbitration on their customers.262 
Supporters of mandatory arbitration assume that arbitration clauses are 
the product of voluntary, informed bargaining.263 The chief proponents of the 
 
257 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 683 (2010) (quoting Mastrobuono 
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)). 
258 See, e.g., In re Universal Serv. Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 
1126 n.9 (D. Kan. 2003); Acquaire v. Can. Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
259 Buffon & Wolson, supra note 68, at 35 (“Consumers must also be given an opportunity to reject 
the agreement, either by walking away from the transaction, returning the product, or in some other way.” 
(citing Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2003))). 
260 Id. at 36 n.24 (“Different courts . . . have somewhat different views of how much freedom a 
customer must have to make a meaningful choice.”). 
261 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 214 (updated ed. 2009) (“So long as there is competition, patients will have to 
get something for relinquishing their rights. We are confident that if the proposal we are making were 
adopted, we would both elect to waive the right to sue, and that many of the finest health care providers 
would offer that option at a real discount.”). 
262 See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 2.3 (“Seven of the eight largest 
facilities-based mobile wireless providers (87.5%), covering 99.9% of subscribers, used arbitration 
clauses in their 2014 customer agreements.”); id. (“For storefront payday loan agreements, 83.7% of 
lenders covering 98.5% of storefronts in our sample used arbitration clauses in their agreements from 
2013 and 2014 . . . .”). 
263 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (“[T]he FAA imposes 
certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a matter of 
consent, not coercion.’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))); Gerald Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust—Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1969) (“Where parties voluntarily choose arbitration as their method of deciding a 
potential antitrust problem, their incentive might include the willingness to provide all the necessary 
books, records and other information so that the arbitral determination will be well-supported by the facts 
and evidence. If one businessman is clearly profiting by skirting close to the fringes of antitrust violations, 
it is unlikely that his contract would ever provide for arbitration.”); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under 
Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Apr. 18, 2002, at 1, 8. 
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FAA in the 1920s implicitly assumed competitive markets when they 
claimed that: “No one is required to make an agreement to arbitrate. Such 
action by a party is entirely voluntary. . . . [The federal arbitration law] is 
merely a new method for enforcing a contract freely made by the parties 
thereto.”264 Some scholars have asserted that, in the context of antitrust 
arbitration, consumers voluntarily agree to “to forego statutory remedies of 
treble damages and attorney fees.”265 
These assumptions, however, do not correspond to reality. Arbitration 
clauses are often imposed on unwilling or unaware consumers.266 Contracts 
of adhesion that include mandatory arbitration provisions are quite 
common.267 The American Safety court argued that antitrust plaintiffs should 
not lose their day in court because of contracts of adhesion.268 In contrast, the 
Supreme Court does not seem to believe that contracts of adhesion are a 
problem for consumers with respect to arbitration.269 Ironically, the Supreme 
 
264 Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 
279 (1926). 
265 Aksen, supra note 263, at 1110 (“No one is forced to arbitrate; but electing to forego statutory 
remedies of treble damages and attorney fees should be given serious consideration.”). But see FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 95, at iv (“Consumers currently have little, if any, choice regarding 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in contracts.”). 
266 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 262 at § 3.2 (reviewing a study where “of the 
respondents that specifically stated that they looked to see if their contracts included arbitration clauses 
(and went on to say that they had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause), 85% had, in 
fact, entered at least one contract with an arbitration clause.” (citing Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little 
Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of 
Arbitration Agreements 61–62 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-0009, Oct. 
29, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516432 [http://perma.cc/B32H-Y9KZ])); FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 95, at 42. For examples of courts enforcing such standard-form agreements to mandate 
arbitration of antitrust claims, see Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc., No. 14-CV-4062-LHK, 
2015 WL 1886882, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015); Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, No. 13 Civ. 
7398(RWS), 2015 WL 1433370, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015). 
267 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”); DOMESTIC POLICY SUBCOMM. 
MAJORITY STAFF, OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM COMM., HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
ARBITRATION ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF CLAIMS FILES OF THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 3 
(2009) (“Virtually all consumer transactions with large businesses are now subject to pre-dispute, 
mandatory arbitration clauses.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 95, at 37; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & 
Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1 
(“Over the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to apply for a credit card, use a cellphone, 
get cable or Internet service, or shop online without agreeing to private arbitration.”). But see Peter B. 
Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After 
Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955 (2014) (finding that franchisors were not switching en 
masse to arbitration despite Italian Colors). 
268 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[I]t is also proper to ask whether contracts of adhesion between 
alleged monopolists and their customers should determine the forum for trying antitrust violations.”). 
269 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750; Baker & Stabile, supra note 4, at 405 (“Justice Blackmun’s 
majority opinion [in Mitsubishi] stressed the broad policy of the Federal Arbitration Act and criticized 
the American Safety rationale for denying arbitration for antitrust claims. First, the majority found 
‘unjustified’ the concern that arbitration would be foisted upon helpless parties to contracts of adhesion—
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Court only seems to care about consent being explicit when it protects 
corporate defendants from class-wide arbitration.270 Yet consumers are 
forced into arbitration without meaningful consent in clickwrap, shrinkwrap, 
and even browsewrap contracts they may never see, much less bargain 
over.271 The weaker party is forced to give up the right to sue for antitrust 
violations in federal court.272 
Arbitration clauses imposed on consumers through contracts of 
adhesion are not truly voluntary.273 The terms in arbitration agreements may 
not reflect any bargaining—or true agreement—at all. For example, the 
agreement at issue in Concepcion authorized AT&T to unilaterally amend 
the consumer contract, including the arbitration provision, at its will, which 
AT&T did “on several occasions.”274 Some commentators have suggested 
that it is only natural and expected that arbitration clauses follow the 
dynamics of contracting in which a more powerful party takes advantage of 
a less powerful party.275 Even if that were true, it is unclear why the fact that 
we should expect no better should be sufficient reason to allow private 
arbitration to replace public litigation in antitrust law, which is imbued with 
the public interest.276 
When it comes to antitrust arbitration, the lack of meaningful consent 
becomes a vicious cycle. Antitrust violations eliminate the competition that 
arbitration supporters assume was present in order to justify enforcing the 
arbitration clause in the first place. For example, if rivals conspire to fix 
 
such parties could attempt to have the arbitration clause set aside by attacking the validity of the 
agreement itself.” (footnote omitted)). 
270 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (“[A] party may not 
be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for 
concluding that the party agreed to do so.”). 
271 See generally NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013) 
(tracing the history of wrap contracts and discussing their ramifications); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Shrinkwrap 
Licenses] (discussing arguments for and against shrinkwrap contracts and suggesting modifications to the 
UCC regarding such contracts); Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 254, at 459–60 (discussing the 
elimination of assent as an element of contract law and problems resulting from browsewrap contracts). 
272 Loevinger, supra note 9, at 1091 (“The private parties in antitrust claims are likely to be of 
unequal economic power and the complainant may have been forced to agree to the arrangement under 
which arbitration is provided.”). 
273 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Dempsey, supra note 8, at 284 (“An individual’s signature to a 
contract with a large retail enterprise containing an arbitration clause can hardly mean that the individual 
has voluntarily relinquished the protection of the courts.”). 
274 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
275 See, e.g., Aksen, supra note 263, at 1102 (“In the vast majority of business life one side has 
relatively smaller bargaining power. Every small businessman is unequal per se to the mammoth 
corporations with whom he must trade in order to survive.”). 
276 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885 
(2012). 
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prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, they could similarly 
conspire to impose mandatory arbitration with a class action waiver in order 
to prevent any class action against their antitrust violation.277 Supporters of 
expanding arbitration to include antitrust claims assume that competition 
will prevent abuse of mandatory arbitration clauses. But antitrust violators 
will have every incentive to simply expand the subject matter of their 
conspiracy to include the prevention of competition with respect to 
mandatory arbitration. 
Such an agreement among competitors to impose pro-seller mandatory 
arbitration terms could itself be an antitrust violation.278 In 1930s Paramount 
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,279 the Supreme Court condemned 
movie distributors who jointly agreed to contract only with theaters that 
agreed to a standard form contract that included an arbitration clause.280 The 
distributor-imposed terms of the standard form arbitration clause were the 
result of “six years of discussion and experimentation” among rival 
theaters.281 The Supreme Court explained: “It may be that arbitration is well 
adapted to the needs of the motion picture industry; but when under the guise 
of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements which unreasonably 
suppress normal competition their action becomes illegal.”282 When a 
conspiracy to impose arbitration clauses is part and parcel of a larger 
conspiracy to fix prices or divide markets, the conspirators can effectively 
prevent their victims from seeking redress in federal court. The antitrust 
violation in this scenario eliminates the competitive market that champions 
of mandatory arbitration assume exists. 
Like price fixers, illegal monopolists can also impose arbitration 
clauses in order to prevent antitrust victims from being able to sue for 
Sherman Act Section 2 violations in federal court.283 Because firms with 
strong bargaining power can impose onerous terms on their business 
 
277 See Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate (on file with author). 
278 See id.; see also Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(“[T]he claim here is that the agreement itself was an instrument of illegality . . . .”); Loevinger, supra 
note 9, at 1094 (“In at least two older cases the courts have noted that arbitration, whatever its normal 
virtues, may be used as part of an arrangement to suppress competition, and that, in such cases, the courts 
must determine the validity of the arrangements under the antitrust laws before arbitration is appropriate.” 
(citing Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 
647 (2d Cir. 1945))).  
279 282 U.S. 30 (1930). 
280 Id. at 37, 42. 
281 Id. at 43. 
282 Id. 
283 See Finn, supra note 92, at 415 (“An intended monopolist, being frequently in a bargaining 
position superior to that of his customer and wishing to avoid the stringent requirements of the antitrust 
laws, could protect himself by imposing an arbitration agreement on his customer.”). 
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partners,284 a monopolist could make all sales contingent on the customer’s 
agreement to waive his or her right to sue for an antitrust violation in federal 
court, or to bring any form of class-wide arbitration. This was essentially 
what happened in Italian Colors, where merchants alleged that American 
Express used its power over charge cards to force merchants to accept an 
illegal tying arrangement.285 The very contract that formed the basis of the 
antitrust violation simultaneously precluded any judicial—or arbitral—
remedy for that violation.286 As Justice Kagan explained in her dissent in 
Italian Colors: 
[The arbitration clause] imposes a variety of procedural bars that would make 
pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool’s errand. So if the arbitration clause is 
enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if it has in 
fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist 
on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.287 
By manipulating the terms of a required arbitration agreement, even an 
illegal monopolist can prevent all class action litigation and class-wide 
arbitration, making it practically impossible for any of its customers to seek 
any form of relief for their antitrust injuries, such as monopoly overcharges. 
As such, the monopolist-imposed arbitration clause is the shield that protects 
an illegal monopoly from antitrust liability.288 
It is unlikely that Congress intended that “contracts of adhesion 
between alleged monopolists and their customers should determine the 
forum for trying antitrust violations.”289 New York’s highest court observed 
during the American Safety era: 
 
284 Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1665, 1680–86 (2012); see also George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer 
and Employment Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 686–87 (2013) (“Professors Choi 
and Triantis persuasively argue that sellers with oppressive bargaining power alone can impose 
inefficiently one-sided terms even between sophisticated parties, because sellers with superior bargaining 
power can screen buyers to reduce the quality of nonprice terms to maximize profit in a way that is not 
socially optimal.”). 
285 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013). 
286 See id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Here is the nutshell version of this case, unfortunately 
obscured in the Court’s decision. The owner of a small restaurant (Italian Colors) thinks that American 
Express (Amex) has used its monopoly power to force merchants to accept a form contract violating the 
antitrust laws. The restaurateur wants to challenge the allegedly unlawful provision (imposing a tying 
arrangement), but the same contract’s arbitration clause prevents him from doing so.”). 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 2314 (arguing that the necessity of a rule against contracts that operate as waivers of federal 
rights “is nowhere more evident than in the antitrust context” since “[w]ithout the rule, a company could 
use its monopoly power to protect its monopoly power, by coercing agreement to contractual terms 
eliminating its antitrust liability.”). 
289 Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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[T]hrough the use of economic power and contracts of adhesion, containing 
broad arbitration clauses, antitrust violators may be able to insulate their 
transgressions of the antitrust law from judicial scrutiny. The opportunity for 
abuse is apparent. Under various guises, an industry, while nominally assuring 
obedience to the State’s antitrust law, may in reality be establishing and 
enforcing entirely unacceptable practices.290 
In concentrated markets where firms use contracts of adhesion to impose 
arbitration clauses, courts should be most wary of antitrust claims being 
shunted off to private, confidential arbitration. Current trends, however, 
indicate that courts are not likely to take action to meaningfully limit the 
scope of adhesive antitrust arbitration agreements. The final Part of this 
Article therefore proposes a nonjudicial solution to this increasingly 
important problem. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF ANTITRUST ARBITRATION THROUGH 
MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
Antitrust arbitration has created problems and issues that were 
unanticipated by the Congress that enacted the FAA. The Supreme Court has 
expanded the scope of arbitration in a manner that undermines the ability of 
antitrust law to protect consumers. Most government actors seem ill-
equipped or unlikely to address the problems outlined in Part II. The 
judiciary is the branch that created the overreaching version of arbitration. 
Some members of Congress have responded to the pro-arbitration opinions 
of the Supreme Court by proposing the Arbitration Fairness Act, which 
would prevent enforcement of some predispute mandatory arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts.291 The likelihood of successful legislative 
action, however, is uncertain at best. In contrast, the Executive Branch—
through the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division—could address the particular issue of antitrust arbitration 
immediately. 
Public and private enforcement of antitrust laws work in tandem.292 
Antitrust lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs have been a critical part of 
 
290 Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223, 227 (N.Y. 1968). 
291 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, U.S. Cong. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.franken.
senate.gov/files/documents/150429_AFAOnePager.pdf [http://perma.cc/WG8U-ZVHY]. 
292 See generally Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence From Private 
Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (evaluating 
the deterrent effect of private antitrust litigation and finding it a complement to the deterrent effects of 
public enforcement). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33–39 
(1984) (arguing that we should limit private antitrust enforcement because the cost of false positives 
outweighs the cost of false negatives). As one of us has argued: 
Judge Easterbrook could speak in 1984 of the asymmetry between false positives and false 
negatives, but the antitrust law he was talking about simply doesn’t exist anymore. Courts in the 
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the American antitrust regime for over a century.293 Antitrust class action 
litigation is particularly important.294 Yet Italian Colors thwarts attempts to 
bring both individual and class-wide actions against antitrust violators. 
Mergers may heighten the need for private as well as government oversight. 
The problems of antitrust arbitration, detailed in Part II, are magnified in a 
post-merger context for the reasons we explained in Part III. These merged 
firms should receive greater scrutiny, but mandatory arbitration of antitrust 
claims means that these firms—which present the greatest antitrust risks—
can evade meaningful judicial scrutiny. 
In this Part, we propose a solution to the growing problem of antitrust 
arbitration. 
A. Conditional Approval of Proposed Mergers 
Mergers among actual or potential competitors increase market 
concentration. Concentrated markets tend to heighten antitrust risks in 
various ways, including facilitating monopolization by a dominant firm and 
making it easier for the remaining firms in the market to collude.295 Because 
of these risks, the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act notes that the Antitrust Division 
and the Federal Trade Commission share responsibility for the review and 
preclearance of mergers that reach a size specified by the Act.296 At the 
conclusion of its review, the government can decide to not challenge the 
merger at all, to attempt to block the merger altogether, or to negotiate certain 
conditions designed to reduce the risk of harm to competition.297 
 
last three decades have dismantled every per se rule applied to vertical conduct, limited the per se 
rule in horizontal conspiracies in a variety of ways, made it harder for plaintiffs to infer conspiracies, 
all but eliminated predatory-pricing claims, and substantially restricted the role of monopolization 
cases. Win rates for antitrust plaintiffs in at least one industry hover below 15%, and court rules 
make it harder and harder for antitrust plaintiffs to show standing to sue to enforce the laws that 
remain. We have no doubt that antitrust at one time was skewed toward over-enforcement, but today 
if there is any bias it is in the opposite direction. 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 700–
01 (2009) (footnotes omitted).  
293 See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private 
Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1 (2013) (examining the virtues of private antitrust litigation in 
light of public antitrust enforcement); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private 
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879 (2008) (evaluating private 
antitrust litigation and finding it an important complement to public enforcement); D. Daniel Sokol, The 
Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 
(2012) (same). 
294 See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text. 
295 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 6–7 
(2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/8P8L-QTX4]. 
296 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). 
297 Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/premerger-
notification-and-merger [https://perma.cc/YWJ8-VV5J ]. 
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When the government allows a merger subject to conditions, those 
conditions can take a variety of forms. One common form of condition is 
structural: the government might force the merging parties to divest or sell 
off certain assets or business units in order to preserve competition in 
particular markets.298 Those divestiture conditions in turn come in two 
flavors. Sometimes the parties and the government have already identified a 
buyer and require the transaction to happen before or immediately after the 
merger is approved.299 Such a divestiture is relatively easy to monitor. 
Other conditional merger approvals mandate a “post-order” divestiture: 
a promise to sell specified assets at some point in the future assuming a 
suitable buyer can be found who is willing to pay a suitable price.300 The 
agencies typically enforce post-order divestitures by requiring the merging 
parties to hold themselves separate in certain respects during the merger 
process so that the separate assets can later be sold.301 Post-order divestiture 
conditions are theoretically binding on the merging entities. But in fact, 
effective enforcement is rare. The agencies may reserve the power to impose 
a “crown jewel” provision that requires divestiture of certain key assets in a 
merger in the event the merged entity fails to divest the agreed assets,302 but 
they rarely do so. As Gelfand and Ewing observe, “[c]rown jewel provisions 
are only rarely included in consent decrees by either agency and, even when 
they are included, they are almost never invoked.”303 They find only two 
examples in this century of enforcement of such a provision, one by the FTC 
and one by the DOJ.304 Post-order divestiture conditions, then, are difficult 
for the agencies to enforce. 
 
298 See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES 23–25 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DT4K-UWMM] (discussing structural and behavioral conditions in merger enforcement). 
299 Id. Gelfand and Ewing refer to these as “buyer up front” divestitures. David Gelfand & Elaine 
Ewing, “Be Careful What You Wish for”: U.S. Government Enforcement of Merger Consent Decrees, 
58 ANTITRUST BULL. 225, 226–27 (2013).  
300 Gelfand & Ewing, supra note 299, at 227.  
301 Id. 
302 See Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/merger-faq#Crown
%20Jewels [https://perma.cc/TZQ5-A2GT]. For an example, see Final Judgment at 10–16, United States 
v. Monsanto Co., No. 1:07-cv-00992 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f239400/239476.pdf [http://perma.cc/A377-X2NJ].  
303 Gelfand & Ewing, supra note 299, at 235.  
304 Id. at 235–36 (citing Order Reopening and Modifying Order, Hoechst AG, No. C-3919 (F.T.C. 
Nov. 22, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/12/hoechsmod.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4WC7-UH2T]; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Mittal 
Steel to Divest Sparrows Point Steel Mill (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/
archive/atr/public/press_releases/2007/221503.pdf [http://perma.cc/NL2K-ZAU7]).  
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A second type of merger condition is behavioral. Rather than requiring 
the company to sell assets, the antitrust agencies will often require the 
merged company to agree to behave (or to refrain from behaving) in certain 
ways. Merged companies might have to agree to license their intellectual 
property to others,305 to agree not to discriminate in business deals,306 or to 
restrict the flow of information between business units in the merged 
company.307 These sorts of conditions are less common than structural 
conditions such as asset divestiture, but they are still regularly imposed, and 
the Antitrust Division has increasingly relied on such remedies.308 We 
conducted a review of every merger consent decree entered into between 
1996 and 2013.309 Of the 403 FTC and Antitrust Division merger consent 
decrees during this period, 124 included conduct conditions as well as 
divestiture.310 
Conduct conditions are much harder to enforce, because the conduct 
being prohibited or required is much less visible to the outside observer than 
is the sale or nonsale of a division of a company. The antitrust enforcement 
agencies will sometimes place a monitor within the company to ensure 
compliance,311 and they have the power to ask the merged firm to produce 
information they can use to gauge compliance.312 But even with the 
assistance of a monitor it is hard to know whether, for instance, information 
 
305 See, e.g., United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688-RLW, at 13–21 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275800/275897.pdf [http://perma.cc/5C47-NEE3]; Silicon Graphics, 
120 F.T.C. 928, 936–38 (1995). 
306 See, e.g., United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106-RJL, at 19–20 (D.D.C. June 29, 
2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f272600/272610.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DP4-K6EZ]; United 
States v. Ticketmaster, No. 1:10-cv-00139-RMC, at 19–21 (D.D.C. July 30, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f260900/260909.pdf [http://perma.cc/8P3W-RM99]. 
307 See, e.g., The Coca-Cola Co., 150 F.T.C. 520, 534–39 (2010). 
308 Compare ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 299 (emphasizing the desirability 
of behavioral remedies), with ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1992 
MERGER GUIDELINES, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GN64-VQKR] (focusing on market structure). 
309 Research on file with authors. 
310 Divestiture deals can also have behavioral components, as when a merged company agrees to spin 
off a division while continuing to provide services or a supply of goods to that division. See, e.g., Decision 
and Order at 11–16, W. Dig. Corp., No. C-4350 (F.T.C. Mar. 5, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/03/120305westerndigitaldo.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7CH3-9UXS]. We included a decree in the 124 conduct-related decrees if it had significant 
conduct-related conditions, even if it also included structural remedies such as divestiture. 
311 The Microsoft settlement and the Apple eBooks judicial decree both involved neutral monitors 
placed inside the company to report on the company’s compliance with the injunction. See Final Judgment 
at 9–13, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.pdf [http://perma.cc/76WK-P499]; Final Judgment at 
10–14, United States v. Apple, Inc., No.1:12-cv-02826-DLC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f300500/300510.pdf [http://perma.cc/JN32-RMXK]. 
312 Supra note 311. 
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is being shared informally between employees in different divisions of the 
same company. Our study of all 403 merger consent decrees that imposed 
ongoing conditions found only eleven cases in which the government sought 
to enforce a provision of a consent decree, and five of those eleven involved 
divestiture agreements. While it is impossible to know how many times 
merged entities violated a consent decree without being caught, or how many 
times the government detected a violation and resolved the issue informally, 
actual enforcement appears to be rare313 and limited to the most egregious 
violations of a consent decree.314 
Even less likely to be enforced are representations made by the merging 
parties in an effort to persuade the agencies to approve a merger. Airlines, 
for instance, often make representations that they will continue or even 
expand a target’s hub when they merge with that target. But it doesn’t 
necessarily happen. American Airlines won approval for its acquisition of 
TWA, for instance, by saying it intended to shift more flights to TWA’s St. 
Louis hub to relieve congestion at its other hubs.315 But it made no legally 
binding commitment to do so, and instead American Airlines soon pulled 
most of its flights out of St. Louis,316 with the result that the merger 
eliminated a competitor but did not otherwise make American’s route 
structure more efficient. United Airlines did something similar in Cleveland 
after buying Continental Airlines,317 as did American Airlines in Pittsburgh 
after buying US Airways.318 Outside the airline industry, Oracle has 
repeatedly purchased competitors, including PeopleSoft and Sun 
Microsystems, ostensibly for the value of their software, and justified the 
purchases on the ground that it would not reduce software options for 
 
313 See Gelfand & Ewing, supra note 299, at 237 (“Because investigations into potential consent 
decree violations are nonpublic, it is difficult to gauge the frequency with which these provisions are 
invoked. Requests from the agencies for the production of information or documents are quite common, 
although it is somewhat rare for formal process to be invoked.”). 
314 Id. at 239 (“There are only a handful of recent cases in which formal enforcement action was 
taken, and examining these cases highlights the fact that violations formally enforced by the agencies 
usually are flagrant . . . .”). 
315 See Kyle DiGangi, Note, Cutting the Financial Fat from the Failing Firm Defense: Refocusing 
the Failing Firm Defense on Antitrust Law, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 277, 298 (2012); Robert Schoenberger, 
End of TWA in 2001 Hurt Hub in St. Louis As American Airlines Focused on Bigger Airports, 
CLEVELAND.COM (May 10, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2010/05/
st_louis_shrunk_by_american_ai.html [http://perma.cc/FM97-FSLK]. 
316 See Schoenberger, supra note 315. 
317 See Ben Mutzabaugh, United Airlines Axing Its Hub in Cleveland, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2014/02/01/united-airlines-axing-its-hub-in-
cleveland/5139385/ [http://perma.cc/UA9V-6R9A].  
318 See Ben Mutzabaugh, Loss of US Airways Facility a ‘Bitter Pill’ for Pittsburgh, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2014/01/28/loss-of-us-airways-facility-a-
bitter-pill-for-pittsburgh/4969169/ [http://perma.cc/WL6Z-EN85]. 
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consumers,319 only to reduce support for that software once the merger went 
through.320 Comcast failed to adhere to the promises it made to antitrust 
regulators in acquiring NBC Universal, a fact that came out only when it 
sought to acquire Time Warner Cable, prompting scrutiny of its record of 
compliance.321 Whether or not these were good business decisions, they 
reflect the inability of regulatory agencies to bind merging firms to their 
claims about the economic effects of their mergers. 
B. Negotiated Abandonment of Mandatory Arbitration for Antitrust 
Claims as a Condition of Merger Approval 
Mergers, then, can risk harm to competition. The antitrust agencies can 
prevent that harm by blocking a merger altogether, and sometimes they do 
so. But more commonly they seek a less intrusive path—approving the 
merger subject to conditions designed to improve competition. And many of 
those conditional approvals impose behavioral rather than structural 
conditions, again in a laudable attempt to be less intrusive on the operation 
of the merged firm. Because the agencies have only a limited ability to police 
and enforce those behavioral conditions, however, private antitrust 
enforcement becomes even more important when mergers increase market 
concentration. And yet, as we have seen, the very fact of that increased 
market concentration, combined with Italian Colors, makes it all too easy 
for firms in concentrated markets to preclude effective private antitrust 
enforcement by using a standard for contract to deny antitrust victims access 
to federal courts. 
 
319 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Regulating Post-Bid Embedded Defenses: Lessons From Oracle Versus 
PeopleSoft, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2007) (“Oracle’s bid threatened PeopleSoft’s value by 
undermining its ability to enter into long-run relational contracts with new customers who were worried 
that Oracle would breach PeopleSoft’s long-run implicit contracts with them. PeopleSoft’s managers 
were able to preserve PeopleSoft’s value by quickly and unilaterally adopting a Customer Assurance 
Program (CAP) designed to ensure that Oracle honored PeopleSoft’s implicit commitments.”).  
320 See Order Granting-in-Part Motion to Dismiss and Granting Motion to Strike at 12–13, Oracle 
Am., Inc. v. Terix Comput. Co., No. 5:13-cv-03385-PSG, 2014 WL 5847532, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 
2014) (allowing antitrust claims to proceed based on allegations Oracle cut support for Sun’s Solaris 
operating system after acquiring Sun); Alorie Gilbert, Oracle to PeopleSoft: The Pink Slip’s in the Mail, 
CNET (Jan. 14, 2005, 11:50 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Oracle-to-PeopleSoft-The-pink-slips-in-the-
mail/2100-1014_3-5536612.html [http://perma.cc/6WK5-AF6N] (describing Oracle cutting more than 
half of the PeopleSoft workforce less than a year after the merger); Ahmed Limam, Dead Software 
Walking: PeopleSoft 7 Years After Its Acquisition by Oracle, AHMED’S UNIVERSE (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://ahmedsuniverse.blogspot.com/2012/09/dead-software-walking-peoplesoft-7.html 
[http://perma.cc/69YT-E68M]. 
321 See Comcast Was So Incredibly Full of Crap During Its Merger Sales Pitch, the Government Is 




LEMLEY & LESLIE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 10:58 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
54 
Fortunately, there is a simple, if partial, solution to the problem of 
ineffective private enforcement of the antitrust laws after Italian Colors. We 
suggest that the antitrust enforcement agencies tasked with approving 
mergers should approve mergers subject to the condition that the merged 
entity promise not to impose or enforce predispute arbitration provisions on 
its customers.322 The government could elect to apply this policy more or less 
broadly depending on the circumstances. Agencies applying this policy in its 
most expansive form could prevent the imposition of any predispute 
arbitration agreement on customers. Doing so would be consistent with the 
problems with arbitration of consumer contracts we noted above, which are 
not limited to mandatory arbitration of antitrust disputes. Under a more 
focused application, the agencies could require that merging firms agree not 
to impose class action waivers on their consumers. The narrowest application 
would, at a minimum, impose a condition preventing the merged firm from 
imposing predispute arbitration on antitrust disputes with customers.323 
There are several reasons to use the merger approval process to impose 
restrictions on predispute mandatory arbitration clauses. This is a decision 
point when government regulators are already examining the merging parties 
and the markets they are operating in. Antitrust officials at this juncture have 
leverage over the firms seeking to merge. Imposing arbitration limitations on 
merging firms is appropriately tailored to the problems with mandatory 
predispute arbitration agreements. As we have seen, arbitration agreements 
are most problematic when they are imposed in a standard-form contract on 
consumers who lack equal bargaining power, when they restrict class actions 
that make it possible to vindicate important public rights that would 
otherwise go unrepresented, and when there is no effective competition over 
contract terms. 
Each of those circumstances is likely to be present for standard-form 
terms that preclude antitrust and other class actions in concentrated markets. 
Consumers are unlikely to be able to read, much less negotiate, the terms to 
which they are being bound.324 Considerable evidence suggests that virtually 
 
322 Our proposal applies only to predispute arbitration agreements. Mandatory agreements of this 
sort, often included in standard-form contracts, create the sort of problems we discussed above. Once a 
dispute has arisen, by contrast, an agreement to arbitrate would no longer be coercive and the disputing 
parties should be free to resolve that dispute in any way they jointly decide to, including arbitration and 
mediation.  
323 If antitrust claims are non-arbitrable, arbitration can still proceed on non-antitrust claims. See W. 
Int’l Media Corp. v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp. 871, 873 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1991).  
 The duration of the condition—including whether it should be subject to a sunset provision—is an 
issue for another day. 
324 On the fictional nature of assent in modern shrink-, click-, and browsewrap contracts, see 
generally KIM, supra note 271; Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 271; Lemley, Terms of Use, 
supra note 254, at 459–60; Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 
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no one reads standard-form terms included in clickwrap and browsewrap 
contracts.325 And even if they did read them, they are unlikely to be able to 
negotiate those terms;326 they are always provided in “take it or leave it” 
form.327 Nonetheless, courts tend to enforce those contracts, even when they 
impose arbitration clauses.328 
Conditioning merger approval on not imposing mandatory arbitration 
clauses in their contracts with customers would facilitate effective private 
antitrust enforcement. Without class actions, relatively long statutes of 
limitations, attorneys’ fees, and treble damages, private antitrust actions are 
not cost effective for many plaintiffs. That is particularly true of consumers, 
the group antitrust law purports to care the most about. Consumers are a 
diffuse group, and each individual consumer is unlikely to have enough at 
stake to bring an antitrust claim, particularly if they cannot recover their 
attorneys’ fees even if they succeed. That is also true of small business 
customers. The individual named plaintiff in Italian Colors, for instance, 
suffered less than $50,000 in harm, far too little to spend the over $1 million 
it would take to bring an antitrust case as an individual arbitration. Each 
individual plaintiff’s loss may be relatively small, but the cost of American 
Express’s anticompetitive conduct was, of course, not limited to the harm 
suffered by a single plaintiff. The collective harm to the groups of small 
businesses affected might well have ranged into the billions of dollars, a 
 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1049–54 (1998); Jason Kuchmay, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Section 
301 Copyright Preemption of Shrinkwrap Licenses—A Real Bargain for Consumers?, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 
117, 137–46 (1997); Kell Corrigan Mercer, Note, Consumer Shrink-Wrap Licenses and Public Domain 
Materials; Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code Validity in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 
30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1287, 1296–97 (1997); Apik Minassian, Note, The Death of Copyright: 
Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 574–83 (1997); Robert J. 
Morrill, Comment, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case Comment on ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 513, 537–50 (1998); Christopher L. Pitet, Comment, The Problem 
with “Money Now, Terms Later”: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” 
Software Licenses, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 345–47 (1997); Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Future 
of Information Commerce Under Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 
1639, 1647–48 (1997). 
325 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2014).  
326 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 95, at 42–43. 
327 Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 271, at 1288–90. 
328 See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Ekin v. Amazon 
Servs., LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 5:13-cv-05682-LHK 
(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014); Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). But other courts have put procedural limits on the enforceability of arbitration clauses that do not 
give consumers reasonable notice of their terms. See, e.g., Savetsky v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., No. 
3:14-cv-03514-SC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015); Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 569 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–79 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Friedman 
v. Guthy-Renker LLC, 2:14-cv-06009-ODW (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (holding an arbitration 
clause in a browsewrap agreement unenforceable against one user, but enforceable against another, based 
on a change in the placement of the “terms and conditions” link). 
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massive harm with implications for society at large that was essentially 
immunized from suit by a form contract’s bar on class-wide arbitration. 
One possible counterargument is that market forces will achieve the 
same end point—that is, a world without socially inefficient arbitration 
agreements. Some have argued that firms will compete on contract terms just 
as they do on price, driving those terms to efficiency over the long run.329 In 
theory, then, customers who oppose arbitration terms could refuse to do 
business with firms that impose those terms. If enough customers did so, 
market pressure might force others to drop those terms. We are skeptical that 
that sort of competition actually happens. Empirical research has shown little 
competition on terms,330 perhaps because no one reads those terms and 
therefore no one knows that they might differ.331 
Even if there were such competition in some markets, however, Hart–
Scott–Rodino review is uniquely well positioned to provide relief in the 
markets where it is least likely to be true. Competition on arbitration terms 
would require, at a minimum, a competitive market in which otherwise 
equivalent products were differentiated only on the consumer friendliness of 
their contract terms. The antitrust agencies review mergers only when they 
reach a certain size, and they are likely to challenge those mergers or impose 
conditions on approval only when the risk of undue market concentration is 
substantial.332 Therefore, challenging predispute arbitration agreements 
during merger review will enable the government to target arbitration 
agreements imposed in those highly concentrated market conditions most 
likely to incubate anticompetitive behavior. 
One effect of having the antitrust agencies impose such a limitation is 
that not all companies—and indeed not all dominant firms—will be subject 
to the restriction. While this may seem unfair, there is a certain equity to it. 
It is only the companies who seek to merge in already-concentrated markets 
that will face this limitation, and those are the very companies we should 
most want to be subject to the full scrutiny of the antitrust laws. It seems 
reasonable that a company that asks for an exemption from government 
 
329 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 968–69 (2005); 
Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 95, 105–06 (2011); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 441–45 (2002). 
330 E.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? 
Evidence From Software Licensing Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (2009) (finding that terms 
actually provided to customers—on which companies could theoretically compete—are no more 
favorable than terms not even provided until after the deal is done); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will 
Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2011).  
331 See Bakos et al., supra note 325, at 5. 
332 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 295, at § 2.1.3. 
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antitrust scrutiny for its merger should have to forego effective immunity 
from private antitrust enforcement going forward.333 
The fact that only some companies are subject to this condition offers a 
sort of natural experiment. If antitrust enforcement is effective even absent 
class actions and access to the courts, it should not matter whether a company 
is subject to such a condition. But if, as we argue here, effective private 
antitrust enforcement requires access to the courts and the strong remedial 
mechanisms of antitrust, we should expect varying patterns of private 
enforcement against companies that can block antitrust lawsuits and against 
those that forego the ability to do so. If the agencies chose to apply our 
proposal more broadly—imposing this condition not only with respect to 
antitrust claims but to class actions more generally—we would have a similar 
window into the effectiveness of class actions as a whole. Further, the uneven 
application of the rule may have an interesting side benefit: companies 
subject to the restriction on arbitration will have an incentive to make the 
best of their situation by promoting the more consumer-friendly nature of 
their terms and conditions.334 While we are skeptical that there is competition 
on terms and conditions now, if it is possible to prompt such competition, 
the best way to do so is by giving some companies no choice but to offer 
more consumer-friendly terms and hope that they can get some mileage out 
of advertising that fact. 
To be sure, these advantages are partial. Because the imposition of 
mandatory arbitration clauses to ban class actions undermines effective 
private antitrust enforcement, the best possible alternative would be to forbid 
predispute mandatory arbitration of those claims altogether. But the Supreme 
Court has foreclosed that option in Concepcion and Italian Colors. 
And that leads us to the final, most practical benefit of our proposal: in 
addition to being reasonably tailored to the antitrust circumstances facing the 
merging companies, a merger condition imposed by the antitrust agencies is 
likely to survive judicial scrutiny. There is precedent for federal agencies 
imposing such a condition, and it is likely (though not certain) to be upheld 
by the courts. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, 
regularly requires companies filing for an initial public offering (IPO) to 
disavow any mandatory individual arbitration agreements in securities cases, 
even though arbitration is permissible in disputes between brokers and their 
 
333 One limitation is that an existing dominant firm that does not merge with any company will not 
be bound by our proposal. While this is an unfortunate limitation, our proposal still improves the status 
quo. 
334 See, e.g., Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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customers.335 The SEC first took this position in 1990, when an IPO applicant 
sought to include an arbitration provision in its governance documents. The 
SEC explained that: 
[I]t would be contrary to the public interest to require investors who want to 
participate in the nation’s equity markets to waive access to a judicial forum for 
vindication of federal or state law rights, where such a waiver is made through 
a corporate charter rather than through an individual investor’s decision.336 
Put another way, it is one thing to mandate that disputes in a one-to-one 
business relationship situated against the background of a competitive 
market must be resolved through arbitration; it is another to make access to 
a company’s stock by the public at large contingent on their collective 
willingness to abandon valuable legal rights.337 The SEC has stuck by that 
policy, informing a registrant in 2012 that it would not approve an 
application that included an “agreement to require individual arbitration of 
any disputes relating to the agreement . . . , including disputes arising under 
the federal securities laws.”338 And it seems to have worked. Eisenberg and 
Miller find that only eleven percent of agreements filed with the SEC contain 
arbitration clauses.339 
Our proposal could be implemented easily, without the need for new 
legislation or even new rulemaking by the agencies. The SEC, after all, did 
not adopt new rulemaking before restricting arbitration clauses; it simply 
began doing so under its enforcement authority. And while the no-antitrust-
 
335 The SEC long precluded mandatory arbitration between stock brokers and their customers, but 
the Supreme Court struck down those provisions in Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220 (1987), and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).  
336 Thomas L. Reisenberg, Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A Reply to Carl Schneider, 
INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Aug. 1990, at 2, 2; see also Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ 
Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (2012) 
(noting that Reisenberg’s statement represented the SEC staff’s position in 1990). 
337 Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding that the Securities Act of 1933 barred 
mandatory arbitration agreements that waived a right to judicial forum). The Shearson cases first limited 
Wilko to circumstances in which access to the courts was necessary to vindicate the substantive rights in 
the Securities Act, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), and later 
overruled it altogether, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
But Congress had the last word, providing in the Dodd–Frank Act that the SEC had the power to prohibit 
the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between “customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or 
municipal securities dealer.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012)). 
338 The Carlyle Group L.P., SEC Comment Letter, File No. 333-176685 (Feb. 3, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527166/000000000012006433/filename1.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Y8XX-FQE8]. 
339 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of 
Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 
(2007). While Eisenberg and Miller attribute this to a general reluctance on the part of publicly traded 
companies to use arbitration, the SEC’s policy is likely to be a significant factor as well. 
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class-action arbitration clause might not contribute directly to 
anticompetitive effects of the merger the agencies seek to remedy, it is 
directly related to the effective enforcement of post-merger conditions, as we 
established in Part III. In any event, it is well-established that antitrust 
agencies can include provisions in a consent decree that they could not obtain 
directly by suit.340  
Consideration of our proposal’s likely fate in the courts is especially 
relevant given the Supreme Court’s recent hostility towards the rights of 
consumer plaintiffs. Since 1990, the Court has continued to cut back on 
consumer access to the courts, holding in Concepcion in 2011 that the 
Federal Arbitration Act preempted state laws that restricted predispute 
arbitration clauses that banned class actions.341 The Court also held that the 
class dispute could not be arbitrated either, requiring individual arbitrations 
instead, though that was based on a (strained) interpretation of the arbitration 
agreement rather than a holding that class disputes could never be 
arbitrated.342 And as noted above, Italian Colors extended that holding to 
conclude that arbitration clauses could trump federal as well as state public 
policy interests.343 All this is evidence of considerable hostility to consumer 
law enforcement, and a decided preference for arbitration, on the part of the 
current Supreme Court. 
These decisions, however, do not foreclose our proposal. Each of those 
cases holds only that public policy does not preclude enforcement of an 
otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate protected under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. They do not hold that there is some legal right to impose an 
arbitration agreement in the first place that a party cannot negotiate away in 
a deal with the government. The SEC doesn’t say “you can’t impose 
predispute arbitration clauses,” but rather “you can’t impose predispute 
arbitration clauses if you want to take advantage of the federal securities laws 
to publicly trade stock.” An antitrust condition would be even more clearly 
 
340 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331–32 (1928) (“Finally, it is urged that the 
decree is void, because the Attorney General had no power to agree to its entry. The argument is that the 
utmost limit of his authority was to agree to a decree which would prohibit the defendants from doing 
specific acts which constitute contracting, combining, conspiring, or monopolizing in violating of the 
anti-trust law; that he was without authority to enter into a contract by which citizens of the United States 
were prohibited absolutely and forever from engaging in the lawful business of conducting stockyards . . . 
and by which many corporations and individuals would be forever taken out of the field of competition 
with others engaged in the same lines of business. . . . [W]e do not find in the statutes defining the powers 
and duties of the Attorney General any such limitation on the exercise of his discretion as this contention 
involves. His authority to make determinations includes the power to make erroneous decisions as well 
as correct ones.”). 
341 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).  
342 Id. at 1751–52. 
343 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). 
LEMLEY & LESLIE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 10:58 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
60 
a voluntary negotiation: “You can’t impose predispute arbitration clauses 
that foreclose private antitrust lawsuits (including class actions) in federal 
court against your company if you want the government to waive its power 
to challenge your merger.” While there are limits on the government’s power 
to impose certain kinds of conditions—the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions being particularly relevant344—these limits do not apply here. The 
government cannot take away or burden a constitutional right by imposing a 
requirement that a party waive that right.345 But there is no constitutional 
right to deny others effective access to the courts via contract. Even if the 
Supreme Court were correct that the Federal Arbitration Act346 encourages 
arbitration,347 that preference is a far cry from a constitutional right to impose 
arbitration agreements on others. 
Some may object to the use of the merger approval process for non-
merger-related ends.348 For the reasons we articulated in Part III, we believe 
there is a connection between mergers and arbitration agreements and 
requiring arbitration of antitrust disputes is more problematic in more 
concentrated industries. But even if that were not true, we think the costs of 
imposing such a condition in the Hart–Scott–Rodino process will be 
minimal. It seems unlikely that companies will decide not to merge rather 
than agree to a deal, for instance. We emphasize that in a perfect world the 
Supreme Court would revisit Italian Colors. But since it seems unlikely to 
do so, our proposal is a second-best solution. 
The condition that merging parties not require arbitration of antitrust 
claims in their contracts need not necessarily eliminate truly voluntary 
antitrust arbitration. Antitrust plaintiffs and defendants could still agree to 
have their case decided in binding arbitration after the dispute arises. An 
agreement to arbitrate an antitrust claim made after the dispute has arisen is 
less likely to be the product of coercion or a contract of adhesion.349 As 
Robert Pitofsky has noted, “there is no problem (as there often would be with 
 
344 For a discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see generally Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).  
345 At least, sometimes it cannot. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is complex, and lots of 
constitutional rights—like the right to free speech—clearly can be waived in a transaction with the 
government. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198–99 (1991) (holding that the government could 
constitutionally restrict the free speech rights of doctors by preventing them from mentioning abortion as 
a condition of receiving federal funding).  
346 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).  
347 The Court is wrong. See Leslie, supra note 5. 
348 See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen at 1–2, Robert Bosch 
GmbH, No. 121-0081 (F.T.C. Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/statement-commissioner-maureen-ohlhausen/
121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SEC-QRQ4]. 
349 Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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arbitration clauses) of a party, because of unequal bargaining power, 
agreeing to a waiver of future rights without knowing exactly what those 
rights will be.”350 Even some courts that refused to enforce predispute 
arbitration clauses allowed parties to agree to arbitrate antitrust claims after 
the dispute had arisen.351 In his Mitsubishi dissent, Justice Stevens noted that 
arbitration agreements “made after the parties have had every opportunity to 
evaluate the strength of their position, are obviously less destructive of the 
private treble-damages remedy that Congress provided. Thus, it may well be 
that arbitration as a means of settling existing disputes is permissible.”352 Our 
proposal allows for the continued use of these post-dispute agreements. 
Our proposal is ultimately quite modest. It merely increases the 
likelihood that the private antitrust claims Congress created more than a 
century ago will actually be heard in federal courts.353 This is more consistent 
with congressional intent than the current system. As Justice Stevens 
explained in his Mitsubishi dissent:  
[A]n antitrust treble-damages case “can only be brought in a District Court of 
the United States.” The determination that these cases are “too important to be 
decided otherwise than by competent tribunals” surely cannot allow private 
arbitrators to assume a jurisdiction that is denied to courts of the sovereign 
States.354  
Some commentators may oppose our proposal by arguing that the objectives 
of merger review should be circumscribed.355 Our proposal, however, does 
not ask the antitrust agencies to use their powers of merger review to pursue 
non-antitrust goals. To the contrary, our proposal argues that in concentrated 
markets, antitrust agencies should try to prevent firms from using their post-
merger market power to impose arbitration clauses that allow these firms to 
evade the effective antitrust scrutiny provided by private litigation. Many 
believe that Italian Colors was wrongly decided and should be overturned. 
 
350 Pitofsky, supra note 107, at 1079. 
351 See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]here is appropriately an ‘exception’ to 
this ‘rule’ against arbitration of antitrust issues for situations ‘when the agreement to arbitrate is made 
after the dispute arises’”) (quoting Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp. 95, 99 (N.D. Ga. 1972)); 
id. at 47–49 (discussing cases); Allison, supra note 15, at 237.  
352 473 U.S. 614, 657 n.33 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
353 The proposal does not require that all antitrust claims be decided by federal judges because post-
dispute arbitration agreements are still enforceable. 
354 473 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Univ. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 850–51 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
355 Cf. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, supra note 348, at 2 (opposing 
consent decree requiring licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) because “this enforcement policy 
appears to lack regulatory humility” and “implies that our judgment on . . . SEPs is superior to that of 
these other institutions”). 
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But one need not hold that view to see the wisdom of limiting antitrust 
arbitration in increasingly concentrated markets. 
CONCLUSION 
We do not, in short, propose to ban all antitrust arbitration, only blanket 
predispute requirements that deprive antitrust plaintiffs of an effective 
remedy. That is what the Court’s Effective Vindication Doctrine purports to 
provide in theory. In the post-Italian Colors world, the antitrust agencies can 
take a substantial step towards truly effective vindication of antitrust rights 
by preventing defendants from forcing their customers to waive their right 
to sue in court. 
The antitrust agencies are uniquely well suited to protect private 
antitrust enforcement—and perhaps class action enforcement more 
generally—in the set of cases that most need it. They have the power to 
prevent predispute blanket waivers of legal rights through mandatory 
arbitration of public law disputes. They should exercise that power as a 
condition of approving mergers, at least in doubtful cases. 
 
